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Abstract
Human capital obtained by individuals during their life-cycle is one of the key factors
contributing to a prosperous society. Human capital, in terms of education and/or work
experience, leads to higher wages and therefore higher welfare of a nation. Therefore, poli-
cies encouraging employment or to acquire higher education could be potentially welfare
improving. My thesis comprises of two chapters in which I study the issues related to hu-
man capital. These chapters contribute to a better understanding of the impact of policies
on the process of human capital accumulation.
In the first chapter ”Employment, Human Capital, Marriage, Fertility, and Child Care”,
I tackle the question of how part-time employment affects wages and future labour supply
of women and evaluate the effectiveness of child care subsidies on the process of human
capital accumulation. I develop and estimate a dynamic model of employment, marital,
and fertility decisions. In the model, labour supply, fertility and parental child investments
are jointly determined. Household decisions are modelled in a Nash bargaining framework,
where outside options are specified as spouses’ value of making decisions as single agents. I
use the estimated model for an ex-ante evaluation of the impact of child care subsidies on
wages and employment decisions of women in the United States.
The second chapter of my thesis focuses on ex-post evaluation of 2012-2013 education
reform in the UK on children’s aspirations toward education. Using a difference-in-difference
estimator, it can be shown that the reform decreased aspirations towards education of
children in England and the decrease in aspirations is larger for children from lower socio-
economic backgrounds.
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Chapter 1
Employment, Human Capital,
Marriage, Fertility, and Child Care
Lena Hassani Nezhad
Abstract I develop a dynamic model of labour supply, fertility, marriage, and child care
decisions of women and men to estimate the degree of substitutability between paid child
care and housework hours. I estimate the model using 1968-1996 waves of PSID. My es-
timates suggest that paid hours of child care are close substitutes to housework hours. I
then use the estimated model to evaluate the impact of a free child care policy for working
mothers. The results indicate that such polices increase part-time employment of women
and also affect marital decisions. On the positive side, child care subsidies increase employ-
ment rates, however, towards the end of the life-cycle, due to state dependence in part-time
employment, there are movements from full-time to part-time employment. Since the re-
turns to part-time employment are lower than full-time employment, the free child care
subsidies, which do not depend on the intensive margins of labour supply, can decrease
life-cycle income of employed women.
1.1 Introduction
Evidence collected from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) suggests that
many women drop out of the labour market or start to work part-time after having children.
Part-time employment, provides women with the flexibility that they need in order to be
able to participate in the labour market. Especially women who already have or who are
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planning to have children value this kind of flexibility, since it enables them to participate in
the labour market while still leaving them with sufficient time to allocate to their children.
On the other hand, the impact of part-time work on human capital accumulation is possibly
lower than that of full-time work and this may result in lower future wage opportunities.
Indeed, Goldin (2014) argues that the nonlinearity in earnings with respect to hours of work
is one of the main contributors to the existing gender pay gap between men and women in
the US labour market.
A policy which can help women to balance family and work life, is provision of affordable
child care. Child care subsidies can increase female labour supply by decreasing costs of
employment. On the other hand, a reduction in the cost of child care increases net labour
income of mothers to the extent that mothers can afford to work less to have the same
level of income. Therefore, if it is the wish of mothers to work less and spend more time
with the child at home, such policies can indirectly decrease hours of work. Since these
two effects work in opposite directions the impact of child care subsidies on labour supply
remains ambiguous. Studies estimating the impact of child care costs on female labour
supply report a wide range of elasticities of mother’s employment with respect to child care
cost and there is no consensus in the literature on how responsive mother’ s employment
decisions are to variation in child care costs 1.
To understand the issues related to employment and child care decisions of women I
develop a discrete choice dynamic programming model of employment and child care deci-
sions. In the model, wages, employment, child care usage, fertility, and marital decisions
are endogenously determined and part-time and full-time human capital affect wages differ-
ently. Household decisions are modeled using a Nash bargaining framework, where outside
options are specified as spouses value of making decisions as single individuals. I use the
1968-1996 waves of the PSID to structurally estimate the parameters of the model using
Simulated Method of Moments. This framework allows me to study the long-term impacts
of child care subsidy programs on wages and various life-cycle outcomes of women and men.
This paper therefore contributes to the literature on child care and female labour supply
in three ways: first, I empirically document that the hourly returns to full-time and part-
time experiences are different and this difference remains even after controlling for education.
This result is ontained by accounting for different processes of part-time and full-time human
capital accumulation. My estimates suggest that the return to part-time experience is lower
than the return to full-time experience and there is a strong state dependence in both part-
time and full-time employment. The second contribution of this paper is to estimate the
degree of substitutability between paid hours of child care and housework hours. Taking
into account wages, employment, fertility, and marital decisions in the households, I show
that housework hours and hours of child care are close substitutes. This result indicates
1 These estimates range from 0.06 to -3.6 (See Blau and Currie (2006) for a survey).
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that changes in the cost of childcare should have significant effects on female labor supply
decisions.
The third contribution of this paper is to study the implications of free child care policy
programs on wages, employment, fertility, and marital decisions. To study the precise nature
of the impact of changes in childcare costs I conduct a policy experiment of a child care policy
conditional on employment of mothers. The first observation from this experiment is that
women move from not working to part-time employment indicating an increase in female
labour supply, however, towards the end of the life-cycle women move from full-time to
part-time employment. This pattern can be explained by the state dependence in part-time
employment. As human capital in part-time sector increases, the return to employment
in that sector exceeds the return to employment in the full-time sector. Consequently,
part-time employment towards the end of the life-cycle increases. Lastly, I exploit the
implications of the policy experiment mentioned above on the marriage market. Following
the adoption of this policy, the fraction of divorcees increases and subsequently the fraction
of married individuals decreases. In the absence of this policy women with a lower stock of
human capital within marriage cannot afford to pay for child care if they get divorced. The
free child care subsidy allows working women to substitute housework hours with child care
at no cost. Therefore, the policy decreases the costs of divorce and leads to an increase in
divorce rates.
In the following, I review the existing literature related to my approach and discuss
the new features of my model that allow me to to shed new light on female labor market
participation in ways that go beyond the existing literature. The first study to develop a full
solution to a model of female labour force participation in a discrete choice dynamic pro-
gramming framework treating experience as an endogenous process is Eckstein and Wolpin
(1989) 2. Francesconi (2002) extends Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) model in two ways: first,
by including fertility as a choice and second by differentiating between part-time and full-
time employment. This paper is similar to Francesconi (2002) in differentiating between
full-time and part-time processes of human capital accumulation and incorporating fertility
as a choice. However, it varies from his model in a number of ways.
First of all, Francesconi (2002) models the decisions of individuals in a unitary frame-
work. By contrast, I model the labour supply decisions of both husbands and wives through
a collective model with no commitment. Modeling marital decisions together with part-time
employment has important implications on allocation of resources within the household.
Working part-time might affect the process of human capital accumulation and result in
lower wages in the future. The lower income upon divorce, which is the outside option
to marriage can change the allocation of resources in the household to the extent that the
agent with a lower outside option has to transfer more resources to the partner to make mar-
2For a survey on Discrete Choice Dynamic Programming literature, see Keane et al. (2011).
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riage a feasible option. In solving the bargaining problem, this paper is similar to (Manser
and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1990), since the bargaining problem is solved as a
solution to a Nash bargaining problem.
In any dynamic bargaining model the issue of commitment to future transfers becomes
important. Can couples commit to the future allocation of resources in the household?
Mazzocco (2007) tests the full-commitment versus no commitment model in a dynamic
framework and rejects the full-commitment against the no commitment model. The most
recent papers estimating a collective model with no commitment are (Gemici, 2007), (Gemici
and Laufer, 2011), (Mazzocco and Yamaguchi, 2006), and (Eckstein et al., 2016). However,
these papers do not differentiate between part-time and full-time human capital accumu-
lation processes. Moreover, they do not model the choice of market hours of child care
together with hours of work. Modeling these two choices simultaneously, allows me to es-
timate the degree of substitutability between housework hours and market hours of child
care.
Secondly, in Francesconi (2002) the household gains direct utility from having a child. In
my model, however, mother and father gain utility from the time spent with children through
production of a public good that can be enjoyed by both parents. In my model, children are
equivalent to a household good produced by the out of labour market time of parents as well
as child care. By modelling the child care decisions together with market hours decisions
of women and men, I intend to understand: first, whether the time spent by the parents
in producing the household good (children) and child care are substitutable. Second, if
the different returns to part-time and full-time employment affects the affordability and
therefore use of child care.
Ribar (1995) develops a static model of child care and employment decisions of married
women. Del Boca (2002) models employment decisions and child care usage of women, how-
ever, she has a unitary setting in which wages do not depend on hours of work. The papers
modeling the child care decisions mostly focus on the outcome of these policies on children
rather than female labour market outcomes. Bernal (2008) models the employment and
child care decisions of women evaluating the impact of employment decisions on cognitive
child development. Del Boca et al. (2014) use a human capital production function and also
model the role of the father in the child’s cognitive development. This paper is different
from the above studies due to differentiating between part-time and full-time human capital
and modeling employment, fertility, child care usage, and marital decisions simultaneously.
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1.2 Data
The data used in this study are taken from 30 waves (1968 to 1997) of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). PSID starts collecting labour market information of individuals
for the previous year from 1969 onwards. Therefore, the effective years of data are 29
periods (1968 - 1996). Following year 1997, individuals have been interviewed biennially.
Since in my model each period is defined as a year, I do not use the collected data from
1997 onwards.
1.2.1 Sample
PSID consists of a core sample, a sample of low income households known as SEO
(Survey of Economic Opportunity sample), a Latino sample (first interviewed in 1990 or
1992), and an immigrant sample (first interviewed in 1997). These samples are endogenously
selected based on their income, ethnicity or immigration status. I drop these oversampled
individuals to overcome any potential biases resulting from sample selection. My sample
is restricted to household residents who are either head or wife and have been interviewed
at least 3 times between 1968 and 1997. Since I model individuals aged 18 to 50, all the
descriptive statistics and subsequent analyses are only reported for a sample of 18 to 50
years old. The unit of observation, therefore, are 18 to 50 years old men and women.
To obtain data on child care, I use Child Development Supplement (CDS) of the PSID.
PSID collected information on a sample of children aged 0-12 in 1997, surveying 2,394 fami-
lies which provides information on 3,563 children. CDS reports the child care arrangements
and programs used since birth of the child up to kindergarten. Mothers could have used
up to 9 different arrangements since the birth of the child. Therefore, hours and costs of
child care can be constructed retrospectively since the child’s birth. Only a few mothers use
more than four types of arrangements, therefore, I construct the child care cost and hours
using the first 4 types of arrangements. The children in CDS were born between 1984-1997.
Figure A.2.1 shows the distribution of year of birth of CDS children. The CDS sample is
matched to the main sample of the PSID, using the Family Identification Mapping System
(FIMS). FIMS maps the parents of the children interviewed in 1997 to the core sample of
PSID.
My unbalanced sample of PSID consists of 8,931 men and women. 52 percent of sample
are women and the remaining 48 percent are men. I can match 1,094 mothers and 1,008
fathers with the CDS sample. Table A.2.1 shows how the descriptive statistics on different
child care arrangements used by the caregiver in the original sample and the matched sample
differ. Tables A.2.2 and A.2.3 show the differences in the number of periods individuals in
14
Figure 1.1: Kernel density estimates of hours of work, men vs women
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the entire sample and CDS sample have been observed. Table A.2.4 compares the proportion
of college graduates in the CDS and Non-CDS sample. CDS sample has about 50% more
college graduates compared to the non-CDS sample. This difference is because women in
the CDS sample are from a younger cohort, who have children aged 0 to 12 years old.
Women in younger cohorts are more likely to attend college.
1.2.2 Part-time Employment - definition and prevalence
Figure 1.1 shows the Kernel density estimates of hours of work of men and women. The
graph shows that hours of work are clustered around certain hours and women are more
likely to work less hours and to stay out of labour market. The left tail of the density of
hours of work for women is thicker and many women tend to work between 10 to 35 hours.
Based on this figure, I define part-time employment as those working more than 10 but
less than 35 hours per week. Those working between 0 to 10 hours are considered as out
of labour market. The remaining women work more than 35 hours and are classified as
full-time employed. Note that PSID is collected annually, therefore data on annual hours
of work might not necessarily reflect part-time employment. This is because the beginning
and end of an spell cannot be identified in the data. Therefore, those not working for half a
year and being full-time employed in the second half of the year are considered as part-time
workers. In addition, a person needs to be out of the labour force for a year to be considered
as not working. The same argument holds for full-time employed individuals 3.
3Note that in labour supply models there is no distinction between not working and unemployed indi-
viduals. It is a common assumption in modelling labour supply that everyone who seeks jobs finds a job
immediately.
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Figure 1.2: Part-time Employment Around the Time of Birth
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384 men and 328 women for whom data at least 3 years before and after birth are available, PSID (1968−1996)
Figure A.2.3 shows the trend in the share of part-time employment of men and women
from 1968 to 1996 in the total labour force. It shows that part-time employment has
been an important type of employment during these years and that the fraction of women
working part-time has remained relatively constant over the course of these years. On the
other hand the share of part-time employed among employed women has decreased (Figure
A.2.3). These graphs together show that women have moved more into full-time rather
part-time employment over this time period. Male’s part-time employment has been rather
stable during these years and about 10 percent of men (in labour force or employed) worked
part-time throughout this time period.
Knowing that part-time employment is more prevalent among women, it is important
to understand what determines the decision of a women to work part-time. Figure 1.2
illustrates the trend in part-time employment of married women and men around the time
of first birth. It shows that the share of women working part-time before birth is about
30 per cent and reaches to its peak at the time of the birth 4. Thereafter, some women
return to full-time employment and the share of part-time workers decreases to about 40
per cent but does not reach to its previous figure. It is clear from this figure that men start
to work more hours in anticipation of the birth. While anticipation of birth could be an
explanation for observing an increase in labour market hours of men, marriage could be
another explanation. It is hard to disentangle these two patterns using graphs. Therefore
4Note that the 70 percent part-time employed women at the time of birth is an indication of the problem
with my data that those who were on maternity leave for half a year are considered as part-time employed.
Therefore, the share of part-time employed mothers at the time of birth should be interpreted with caution.
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Figure 1.3: Weekly Hours and Cost of Child Care of Mothers - by employmnet status and
child’s age
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in the next section I develop a model of marriage, fertility, labour supply and child care to
explain these patterns in the data.
Figure A.2.4 and A.2.7 show the proportion of employed around the time of birth. It is
clear that before birth around 90 percent of women were employed (this is a sample of 328
women and does not necessarily represent the population nor my sample of PSID). One year
after birth this proportion decreases to around 60 percent and remains relatively constant
7 years after birth. Figure A.2.7 shows that in the sample of 384 men , whose employment
status 3 years before and after birth were observed, nearly all of them were and remained
employed around the birth of the first child. Figure A.2.6 and A.2.8 show the share of
part-time employed in the total labour force. For women this share is relatively constant
before and after the birth. This is because the proportion of out of labour force increases
significantly after birth and brings down the proportion of part-time employed individuals.
Part-time employment becomes particularly prevalent around the birth of the first child
and not all women return to full-time employment subsequently. There might be various
reasons for observing such patterns in persistence of part-time employment. One expla-
nation could be the preferences of women to spend more time with the child. Another
possibility is that those who work part-time, do not have the option or cannot afford to pay
for the full-time child care cost. The left panel of Figure 1.3 shows the weekly hours of child
care used by mothers conditional on their employment status. Both part-time and full-time
working mothers use about 10 hours of child care when the child is less than one year old.
As the child gets older, part-time working mothers use about 15 hours of child care, while
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full-time working mothers on average use double the child care hours of part-time working
mothers. The hours that the child spends in child care decreases significantly when the
child passes 6 years old. By the age of 6, most of the children are already in kindergarten
and CDS collects data only on pre-kindergarten child care 5. The right panel of figure 1.3
reports the costs of child care by employment status of mothers. Full-time working mothers
spend about 50 dollars on child care while part-time working mothers’ weekly cost of child
care is about 35 dollars. Hourly cost of child care however does not statistically significantly
differ between part-time and full-time working mothers (Figure A.2.9).
Table A.2.5 shows weekly hours and cost of child care used by married mothers are
different than those used by single mothers. Married mothers use more hours of child care
and subsequently spend more on child care. We can see in Figure A.2.10 that the difference
in the cost of care is not only due to hours of care used by mothers but also single mothers
pay less per hour on child care. This difference can be explained by policies already in place
in the United States that grant single low-income mothers child care benefits. The second
explanation could be due to the lower income of single mothers as compared to married
mothers who can rely on the income of fathers to pay for child care. We can see in table
A.2.6 that employment status of married fathers is not a good predictor of hours of child
care used in the household compared to employment status of mothers. Patterns of child
care usage seem to be more dependent on employment status of the mother.
Part-time employment is an important type of employment for women and becomes
prevalent after the birth of the first child. However, part-time employment might or might
not be used as a temporary type of employment. Table A.2.7 shows two-step transitions
matrix between different labour market states. We can see that about 73 per cent of women
remain in the same employment status as in the previous period (sum up the numbers on
diagonal). While 80 per cent of women working full-time in the first period continue to
work full-time in the next period, only 26 per cent of part-time employed women move
to full-time employment in the next period. On the other hand, 17 per cent of part-time
employed women move out of the labour force. We can conclude from this table that some
women use part-time employment as a transitory type of employment. However, 55 percent
of part-time employed women remain part-time employed in the next period, which gives
some evidence on state dependence of part-time employment.
When we look at the three step transition patterns in table A.2.10 only about 48 per-
cent of part-time employed women in the first period continue to work part-time in the
third period (9.8+1.3+1.9 out of 27). However, 64 percent of women, who were employed
part-time for two consecutive years, continue to work part-time in the third period. The
persistence in part-time employment become more apparent in this table, which indicates
5The age that a child must be in kindergarten in the united states varies across states. In 1998, the must
entry age was between 5 to 8 years old. See Table 3 in (Datar, 2006).
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that part-time jobs or the type of human capital associated with part-time jobs might be
systematically different than full-time employment. Consequently when part-time employed
for a few periods, it is more difficult to move to full-time sector jobs. The three step tran-
sition patterns also show that 59 per cent of women stay in the same labour market status
over 3 years which is an indication of a dynamic labour supply patterns of women.
In the bottom part of table A.2.7, we can see that men’s labour market transitions is
extremely stable and about 87 per cent remain in the same employment status over two
years. About 10 per cent of men work part-time and 57 percent of them move to full-time
employment in the second period which is substantially higher than the 26 percent part-
time employed women moving to full-time employment. In table A.2.11, we can see that
among all men who were part-time employed in the first period, only 28 percent remain in
part-time employment in the third period (1.5+.23+1 out of 9.7). Tables A.2.8 and A.2.9
report the two step transition patterns but with different part-time specifications. We can
see that the stickiness in part-time employment pertains even with different specifications
of part-time employment.
1.2.3 Part-time Employment and Wages
Because of either preferences or availability of child care, women tend to change their
working hours around the birth of the child. one explanation could be that women who
work part-time select into occupations that are more likely to employ part-time workers.
The human capital accumulated on such jobs cannot be easily transferred to full-time jobs
in sectors and occupations which need other types of skills. Therefore, by choosing to spend
more time at home and with children there might be some long-term consequences on future
employability of women. In what follows, I further explain the dynamics and movements
across full-time and part-time employment sectors.
Figure 1.4 shows the difference between median log hourly wages of part-time and full-
time workers between 1968 and 1996. I have taken into account the impact of inflation, and
all wages are deflated using Consumer Price Index to 1984 US dollars. The pay penalty
in women’s hourly wages is of a higher significance than for men. This can be due to the
fact that men work less part-time and it is harder to get a precise estimate in their pay
penalty. The difference between hourly wages of part-time and full-time workers is known
as part-time pay penalty in the literature. Different studies have not reached to a consensus
on whether there is a pay penalty associated with part-time employment. Some argue
that the pay penalty vanishes after controlling for workers and job characteristics of part-
time workers (in the US: Hirsch (2005) and in the UK: Manning and Petrongolo (2008)).
Some find that this pay penalty does not vanish controlling for these factors (Spanish data:
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Figure 1.4: Part-time pay penalty - by gender
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Figure A.2.11 reports the coefficients on the differential hourly returns to different work-
ing hours compared to working less than 10 hours. We can see that the hourly returns to
working more than 30 hours is considerably higher. Figure A.2.12 shows the differential
returns by gender. The differential returns between part-time and full-time employment
exists can be seen for both genders but for women is considerably higher (figure A.2.11).
Motivated by these graphs, table A.2.12 - A.2.14 show the results for regression of a
Mincer wage equation, in which I allow for the differential impact of part-time experience.
The coefficient on return to hourly experience is positive for all specifications showing that
experience has a positive impact on hourly wages. However, the coefficient on hourly part-
time experience is negative indicating that the return to hourly part-time experience is
statistically significantly different from full-time experience. While there is a clear decreas-
ing return to total experience, the coefficient on part-time experienced squared is positive
showing that the return to part-time experience is relatively less concave than that of full-
time experience. Table A.2.13 shows the same patterns as the regression for the entire
sample, however, table A.2.14 does not show any impact of differential returns of part-time
employment on men’s log hourly wages. The lower constant in the Mincer wage regressions
of women compared to men shows that a woman with no education and no experience
6I would like to thank Alan Manning and Barbara Petrongolo for sharing their Stata code so that I could
plot graphs similar to the Part-time Penalty graph in their paper.
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earns less than her male’s counterpart. In addition, the higher coefficient on total hours
of experience for women indicates that experience has a larger positive impact on hourly
wages of women.
The above estimated Mincer wage equations suffer from the possibility of selection bias.
If those with potentially lower skills select into part-time employment, there might be a
negative selection bias in estimation of returns to part-time employment. Therefore, the
estimated coefficients of the above regression cannot be correctly interpreted. In the next
section, I develop a model of fertility, labour supply, marital, and child care decisions of
men and women in a dynamic framework to understand whether the return to part-time
employment is different from the return to full-time employment. In my estimations, I take
into account fertility, marital, and child care decisions.
1.3 Model
In this section I develop a dynamic model of labour supply, fertility, child care, and
marital decisions of women w and men m. I start modeling behaviour of non-college and
college graduate individuals at age a = 18 and a = 22, respectively. Individual i can be a
woman or man, j ∈ {m,w}, and starts her/his finite life with no work experience and the
decision horizon ends at age A = 50, an age after which there are no fertility decisions for
most people.
1.3.1 Choice Sets
In each period, labour supply, fertility, child care, and marital decisions are endogenously
determined as a result of an individual’s or a couple’s optimizing behaviour. To make the
model computationally feasible, I make four assumptions. First, men only work full-time
but can choose to work different hours within full-time employment. This assumption is
not very restrictive as the observed proportions of non-working and part-time employed
men are low in the data. Secondly, I assume a static budget constraint which does not
allow for consumption smoothing through savings over the life-cycle. Although, a model
with endogenous savings and human capital would be more realistic, I have made the
choice of focusing on the endogenous part-time and full-time human capital accumulation
of women. Adding another source of dynamics to the model increases the state space and
adds considerable computational burden to the solution of the model. The third assumption
is that the individual’s total time endowment is spent on home production and labour
market work. This assumption is made to reduce the size of the choice sets. Fourthly, to
avoid tracking number of children and to reduce the size of the state space, I assume that
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individuals can have only one child .
Women can choose between three different states of employment denoted by k ∈ {f, p, o}
representing full-time (f) and part-time (p) employment, and not working (o). At each age
a, individuals decide on labour supply (lja), fertility (n
j
a ∈ {0, 1}) as well as the decision
to marry. Mothers and fathers also decide on how much child care to use (HjCC,a). Hours
of child care are also discrete: CC ∈ {fcc, pcc, occ} representing full-time, part-time and
no child care, respectively. When married, husband and wife jointly decide on the above
choices as well as the decision to divorce. The vector of choices are as follows:
Single men’s choices: Ψmsingle = (l
m
a , H
m
CC,a, n
m
a )
Single women’s choices: Ψfsingle = (l
w
a , H
w
CC,a, n
w
a )
Married couple’s choices: Ψmar = (l
w
a , l
m
a , HCC,a, na)
Working hours of men and women are lma ∈ {7, 9} and lwa ∈ {0, 3, 5, 7, 9} hours per day,
respectively. 0 represents not working, 3 and 5 are part-time working hours and 7 and 9
are full-time working hours. Hours of child care are CC ∈ {9, 4, 1}. If an individual has
a child, she has to use at least one hours of child care. In section 1.3.5 I will explain the
reasons for making this assumption.
1.3.2 Human Capital and Wage Equations
In estimating the returns to participation in the labour market, one of the main issues is
selection bias (Heckman, 1977). The problem is that wages of non workers are not observed.
If those who decide to work are individuals with a higher productivity at home, by ignoring
the wages of non-workers, one might get a selection bias in estimation of the wage equation.
A similar selection problem persists when we estimate the returns to part-time and full-time
employment decisions. In particular, there might be some unobserved factors which affect
part-time and full-time employment decisions and are correlated with observed factors such
as labour market experience, presence of children, marriage, and/or availability of child
care.
I address the problem of selection bias by estimating wages and participation decisions,
simultaneously. I estimate two different wage equations for part-time and full-time employ-
ment which are a function of observed and unobserved factors. The unobserved factors can
endogenize the impact of the factors affecting wages, which are not observed in the data but
eventually determine participation into part-time and full-time employment. In the wage
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equations, hours of work are translated into part-time and full-time experience levels which
affect wages differently. Similar to Francesconi (2002), I allow the returns to full-time and
part-time experiences to vary by the current employment status. Allowing such differences
in parameters can generate state dependence in part-time and full-time employment and
enforce employment in the sector with a higher accumulated human capital.
Part-time and full-time hourly wage equations are:
log(ywk,a) = β
w
0,k + β
w
1,kXf,a−1 + β
w
2,k(Xf,a−1)
2
+ βw3,kS
w + β4,kXp,a−1
+ β5,k(Xp,a−1)2 + wk,a
ywk,a are women’s hourly wages depending on age and employment status k ∈ {f, p}. Xk
are part-time and full-time specific experiences. Sw ∈ {0, 1} is equal to 1 if the individual
is a college graduate and is equal to 0 if has lower education levels. wk,a reflect any changes
in earnings which is independent of household decision process 7. wk,a are per period shocks
to full-time and part-time wage offers.
Since men only work full-time their wages depend only on full-time experience:
log(ymf,a) = β
m
0,f + β
m
1,fXf,a−1 + β
m
2,f (Xf,a−1)
2
+ βm3,fS
m + mf,a
mf,t is the shock to the full-time wage offers of men. The wages shocks are independently
and identically normally distributed:
mf,a
i.i.d∼ N(0, (σmf )2)
wf,a
i.i.d∼ N(0, (σwf )2)
wp,a
i.i.d∼ N(0, (σwp )2)
7I expect the estimated wage equations to differ from Francesconi (2002) since my unconditional wage
estimates take into account not only fertility and employment decisions but also marital and child care
decisions.
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The dynamics is introduced to the model using a learning by doing framework in which
past experiences directly determine wages. In a learning by doing model the value of work
is no longer simply wages but includes the return to experience. Part-time and full-time
work experience accumulate according to the following laws of motion:
Xjf,a = X
j
f,a−1 + 1× 1{lja = 7, 9}
Xwp,a = X
w
p,a−1 + 1× 1{lwa = 3, 5}
By working full-time or part time the sector specific human capital accumulates by 1.
Since men always work full-time, their age and experience can be used interchangeably; e.g.
a male college graduate’s full-time experience is Xmf,a = age
m − 22.
1.3.3 State Space
I start explaining the model by specifying the state variables and their evolution over
the life-cycle. The state space of a single man comprises of education, full-time experience,
stock of children (Nma ), wage shocks, child care costs’ shocks (CC,a), and shocks to utility
of having children (ch,a).
Ωma = {Sm, Xmf,a−1, Nma , mf,a, ch,a, CC,a}
State space for a single woman, contains all the above variables as well as her part-time
experience and shocks to her part-time wage.
Ωwa = {Sw, Xwf,a−1, Xwp,a−1, Nwa , wf,a, wp,a, ch,a, CC,a}
When married, the state of a couple, in addition to the union of the above state variables,
includes shocks to utility of marriage (mar,a). Each partner receives the same marriage and
child preference shock. The number of children in the household at the time of marriage is
equal to Na = max{Nwa , Nma }.
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Ωa =
{
Sm, Sw, Xhf,a−1, X
w
f,a−1, X
w
p,a−1, Na, 
m
f,a, 
w
f,a, 
w
p,a, ch,a, mar,a, CC,a
}
Individuals with a college degree, enter the model at a = 22 and those without a college
degree enter the model at age a = 18. Since education is exogenous, its value remains the
same in the entire life-cycle. I assume that individuals have no previous labour market
experience at the age that they finish schooling implying that initial part-time and full-time
experiences are zero. The evolution of state variables over the life-cycle depends on fertility
and employment decisions. The choice of hours of child care and marital decisions also affect
the state variables, however, only through affecting employment and fertility decisions.
1.3.4 Individual’s and Couple’s Problems
In the model, single and married individuals face different choice sets, state spaces,
and constraints. I start with explaining the behaviour of single individuals in the terminal
period A and then I move backwards to period A−1. I explain the model from the terminal
period since the model does not have a closed form solution and it is solved numerically
using backward recursion.
Singles at age A
The individual’s problem in the terminal period is to maximize the instantaneous utility
subject to budget and time constraints. The individual’s problem in period A is character-
ized as follows:
V jA(Ω
j
A) = max
Ψjsingle
U(cjA, Q
j
1,A, Q
j
2,A, )
s.t. hjA = 17− ljA
NIj + yjf,Al
j
A × 1{ljA = 7, 9}+ ywp,AlwA × 1{lwA = 3, 5} = cjA + (piCC + CC,A)HjCC,A ×N jA
Q1,A = f(h
j
A)
Q2,A = f(h
j
A, H
j
CC,A)×N jA
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In each period, individuals gain utility from consumption of a private good (cA) and
household goods. There are two different types of household goods: Q1,A and Q2,A. Q1,A
represents value of goods produced at home such as a meal or a clean house. Q2,A serves
as child’s qualities which are valued by the parent: such as the child’s kindness, honesty or
self-discipline. Parents enjoy Q2,A in addition to Q1,A while individuals without a child only
gain utility from Q1,A.  is a vector of preference shocks containing per period shocks to
utility of having a child ch,A and utility of being married mar,A. Ω
j
A comprises of the values
of state variables of individual j in period A. hjA represents housework hours of individual
j, piCC represents hourly cost of child care and CC,A is shocks to the cost of child care. NI
is Non-labour income. HjCC,A is market hours of child care. Household goods are produced
using housework hours. However, parents can use both housework hours and paid child care
in the child quality production function. The problem of the single individual is therefore
to find a combination of employment, fertility and child care decisions which maximizes
his/her utility. Finally, V jA(Ω
j
A) is the the value function for individual j at state Ω
j
A when
j is single. The transitory shocks to child care costs, and preference shocks are distributed
as follows:
CC,a
i.i.d∼ N(0, σ2CC)
ch,a
i.i.d∼ N(0, σ2ch)
mar,a
i.i.d∼ N(0, σ2mar)
Couples at age A
Value of marriage is determined by solving a Nash bargaining problem in which the
outside options are defined as values of remaining/becoming single of each partner. The
outside option (threat point) is given by the utility of an agent in case negotiations break.
Therefore, the threat point in a household bargaining model is the value of divorce or the
value of remaining single. The outcome of Nash bargaining is characterized by the solution
to the following maximization problem:
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max
{cjA,Ψmar}
(U(cmA , Q1,A, Q2,A, )− V mA (ΩmA ))θ(U(cwA, Q1,A, Q2,A, )− V wA (ΩwA))(1−θ)
s.t. hjA = 17− ljA, j = m,w∑
j=m,w
NIj + ymf,Al
m
A+y
w
f,Al
w
A × 1{lwA = 7, 9}+ ywAlwA × 1{lwA = 3, 5}
=
∑
j=m,w
cjA + (piCC + CC,A)hCC,A ×NA
GA = f(h
m
A , h
w
A)
Q1,A = f(GA)
Q2,A = f(GA, HCC,A)×NA
In the Nash product, V jA(Ω
j
A) is the value of being single for individual j. θ determines
the bargaining power of each spouse. GA is a composite good produced at home with
the housework hours of men and women. The composite good will be used in production
of household goods Q1,A and Q2,A. By solving the above maximization problem, optimal
transfers and optimal choice within marriage can be found. I denote by W jA(ΩA), j = m,w,
the value functions for both partners corresponding to the optimal choices of the couple ob-
tained from Nash bargaining. These value functions include the optimal transfers between
spouses through their individual incomes and individual consumption.
Singles at age a < A
Single individual’s problem at age a < A is to maximize the instantaneous utility as
well as the expected discounted value of life-time utility. If individual j meets a potential
partner, they can decide to marry which affects their value functions at age a + 1. For
a + 1 = A, this was explained in Section 1.3.4. For a + 1 < A, the Nash bargaining
problem is described in Section 1.3.4. The individual’s problem in period a is characterized
as follows:
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V ja (Ω
j
a) = max
Ψjsingle
U(cja, Q
j
1,a, Q
j
2,a, ) + δ
E[V
j
a+1(Ω
j
a+1|Ωja)], if stays single
E[W ja+1(Ωa+1|Ωa)], if gets married
s.t. hja = 17− lja
NIj + yjf,al
j
a × 1{lja = 7, 9}+ ywp,alwa × 1{lwa = 3, 5} = cja + (piCC + CC,a)HjCC,a ×N ja
Q1,a = f(h
j
a)
Q2,a = f(h
j
a, H
j
CC,a)×N ja
δ is the discount factor. If j decides to marry the match, then the problem will involve
calculations of future expected values of getting married 8. Therefore, expected future values
of life-time utility for single individuals include the expectations from future possibilities of
getting married.
Marriage Market
In each period a, individual j meets a potential partner with probability ω. When a
meeting occurs, the characteristics of the potential partner are determined by a random
draw from the distribution of potential partners. These characteristics of the potential
partners are discretely uniformly distributed. I assume that individuals always meet a
potential partner of the same age. This assumption is made due to the computational
purposes, to avoid including age of the partner as a variable in the state space. Therefore,
the characteristics of a potential spouse of a woman, only includes education and current
stock of children of the partner because age of men are enough characteristics to learn about
work experiences of men. However, vector of characteristics for potential spouse of a man
includes full-time and part-time experience levels of the woman.
Couples at age a < A
As for a = A, value of marriage in period a is determined by solving a Nash bargaining
problem in which the outside options are defined as values of remaining/becoming single of
each partner. The outside options in period a < A also include the possibilities of possible
future marriages. The outcome of Nash bargaining is characterized by the solution to the
following maximization problem:
8The expectations are taken over the transitory shocks and are calculated using Monte Carlo Integration.
28
max
{cja,Ψmar}
(
U(cma , Q1,a, Q2,a, ) + δ
E[V ma+1(Ωma+1|Ωma )], if singleE[Wma+1(Ωa+1|Ωa)], if married
}
− V ma (Ωma )
)θ
(
(U(cwa , Q1,a, Q2,a, ) + δ
E[V wa+1(Ωwa+1|Ωwa )], if singleE[Wwa+1(Ωa+1|Ωa)], if married
}
− V wa (Ωwa )
)(1−θ)
s.t. hjA = 17− ljA, j = m,w∑
j=m,w
NIj + ymf,Al
m
A+y
w
f,Al
w
A × 1{lwA = 7, 9}+ ywAlwA × 1{lwA = 3, 5}
=
∑
j=m,w
cjA + (piCC + CC,A)hCC,A ×Na
GA = f(h
m
A , h
w
A)
Q1,A = f(GA)
Q2,A = f(GA, HCC,A)×Na
The solution to the above problem, entails all possibilities of future marriages and future
values of remaining single. Considering the possibilities of future marriages and divorces,
optimal transfers and optimal choice within marriage will be determined. The marriage
decision of individual j at age a, affects the value functions at age a + 1. If individual j
decides to get divorce, his value function in period a+ 1, will be a single individual’s value
function and if decides to stay married, his value function in period a+ 1 will be a married
individual’s value function. For period a+ 1 = A, the calculation of single value functions
and married value functions were explained in Sections 1.3.4 and 1.3.4, respectively.
1.3.5 Functional Forms
Preferences
The instantaneous utility function is:
Ua = αc ca + αq1 Q1,a + (αq2 Q2,a + αch + ch,a)×Na + mar,a × 1{married}
αc and αq1 represent marginal utility of consumption and household goods. αq2 rep-
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resents marginal utility from child’s quality. αch is the direct utility from having a child.
ch,a and mar,a are per period shocks to utility of having a child and being married. These
shocks are independently and identically normally distributed.
Household Production
Singles: Single individuals without a child produce the household good using housework
hours:
Qj1a = λh
j
a
λ represents marginal productivity of housework hours. When a child is present in the
household, housework hours can be used not only to produce the household good, but also
contribute to production of child’s quality which is enjoyed by the mother/father.
Qj2a = λ
(
(hja)
γ + (H
CCja
)γ
) 1
γ
I assume a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production technology to estimate
the degree of substitutability between housework hours and child care. γ determines this
degree of substitutability. To be able to estimate the curvature of the production technology,
I assume that when a child is in the household, parents always use an hour of child care.
Couples: When individuals are married both husband’s and wife’s housework hours is
spent on production of a composite good (Ga).
Ga = αmh
m
a + αwh
f
a
I assume that housework hours of men and women are perfect substitutes. Therefore,
production of this composite good depends only on the marginal productivity of husband’s
(αm) and wife’s (αw) housework hours. This composite good is an input into production of
household’s goods.
Q1a = λGa
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Similar to the case of single individuals, when a child is present the production function
takes the following CES functional form:
Q2a = λ
(
Gγa + (HCCa)
γ
) 1
γ
The only difference between the production of household goods of single and married
individuals is that the inputs into single individual’s production function is the individual’s
housework hours. On the other hand, married individuals use the composite good as an
input into the production function.
1.4 Estimation
McFadden (1989) proposes to use Method of Simulated Moments in estimating models
that require numerical integrations. I use the following method of moment estimator:
argmin g(θ)′Wg(θ)
The simulated method of moments searches for the values of θ (a vector that contains all
the unknown parameters) that minimize the distance between the moments calculated from
the simulated data and the moments calculated from the actual data. W are the weights,
which are the inverse of the estimated variances obtained from the actual data, divided by
the number of individuals that contribute to each moment. g(θ) is defined as follows:
g(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
gi(θ) = [m¯1 − µ1(θ), ..., m¯k − µk(θ)]
where (m¯1, .., m¯k) correspond to the data moments,and (µ1(θ), .., µ1(θ)) are the corre-
sponding model moments. N denotes the number of individuals in the sample.
Data from 1968-1997 of PSID are used to estimate 31 parameters of the model, struc-
turally. The steps are as follows, the solved model is used to simulate an artificial database
of labour supply, fertility, child care choices, and marital status of individuals. Thereafter,
the moments of these simulated data are calculated and will be compared to the actual
moment from the data.
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1.4.1 Identification
Various moments conditional on individuals’ age and transition matrices are used to
identify 31 parameters of the dynamic model. I use average full-time hourly wages of men
conditional on returns to full-time experience and returns to schooling by age, to identify
the parameters on returns to full-time experience and returns to schooling. To identify
the parameters of full-time and part-time wage equations of women, I use part-time and
full-time average hourly wages conditional on full-time experience, part-time experience
and education by age. Variations in part-time and full-time wages pin down the shocks to
full-time and part-time wages.
There are 3 free parameters in the utility function to be estimated: αC+αq1+αq2+αch =
1. Average wages conditional on employment decisions by age identify marginal utilities
from consumption and household production. Fraction of people having children identifies
direct utility from having a child and the transitory shocks to utility of having a child but
I cannot identify these two parameters separately. I use fraction of married individuals and
transitions into divorce and marriage to identify probability of meeting a potential partner
as well as shocks to utility of being married.
The degree of substitutability between housework hours and child care is identified using
variations in proportions of individuals using child care conditional on full-time employment,
part-time employment and not working. Parameters on marginal productivity of housework
hours of married men and women are identified using the change in labour market hours
after marriage and I assume αm + αf = 1 . Since I do not have data on consumption
of individuals in the household, I cannot identify the bargaining parameter in the Nash
Product. Therefore, I assume that bargaining power of husband and wife are equal.
1.5 Results
I present the set of estimated moments obtained from estimations in this section to
show how the model performs in fitting the patterns observed in the data.
1.5.1 Model Fit
Figures A.3.1-A.3.19 and Tables A.3.1-A.3.3 show the model fit.
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Figures A.3.1-A.3.4 show the patterns in employment rates for single and married moth-
ers compared to non-mothers. The model does a very good job in fitting the life-cycle em-
ployment patterns observed in the data. However, it overstates the full-time employment
rates and understates the unemployment rates of both single and married mothers. Figures
A.3.5 - A.3.8 show that the model also does very well in fitting the employment patterns of
single and married women by their education.
Figure A.3.9 shows the fit for log hourly wages of women by education and employment
status, by age. The model does a good job in fitting wages but overstates hourly wages of
part-time employed women without a college degree. Figures A.3.10 and A.3.11 illustrate
the log hourly wages by employment status and education. The model in general does a
good job in fitting the marginal return to full-time experience of part-time and full-time
employed women. However, the fitted part-time wages, show a larger decreasing marginal
return to full-time experience of part-time employed women (Figure A.3.10). The returns to
part-time experience when the individual is part-time employed is also overstated (Figure
A.3.11). Figure A.3.12 shows the fraction of part-time and full-time employed women by
part and full-time experience. It can fit the patterns observed in the data that full-time
employment is a negative function of part-time experience. However, full-time employment
is relatively flat in full-time experience which is not in line with the data. The model
does a good job in showing that part-time employment decreases as full-time employment
increases and it is positively related to part-time experience. These features are particularly
important in my estimations because they help in showing the state dependence in part-time
and full-time employment.
Figure A.3.13 and A.3.14 show the fitted patterns in log hourly wages of men by ed-
ucation and marital status. The model does a good job in showing that wages of college
graduates are higher than non-college graduates. However, it overstates wages of men with-
out a college degree. Figure A.3.15 shows the log hourly wages of single and married women.
The model does a good job in fitting the wages by marriage but it slightly overstates the
wages of married part-time workers. Figure A.3.16 the daily income from full-time and
part-time employment are also well-fit fir the data.
Figure A.3.17 and A.3.18 show that the model can predict marriage rates and divorce
rates of men and women. However marriage rates are overstated and as a result divorce
rates are understated. Figure A.3.19 shows the model does a good job in predicting the
patterns in the fraction of single women and men with children. It, however, overstates the
proportion of individuals having children.
Table A.3.1 fits the pattern in the data that full-time and part-time working single
mothers use more child care than non-working mothers. However, very few single mothers
use child care when we compare these fractions with the data. We can see more variations
33
Table 1.1: Wage Parameters
Model Parameters Description Estimated Values
Wage parameters (Full-time Employment, Male)
βm0,full 1.764
βm1,full Return to full-time experience 0.085
βm2,full Dec/inc return to full-time experience -.0025
βm3,full Return to education if full-time employed 0.211
Wage parameters (Part-time Employment, Female)
βw0,part 1.393
βw1,part Return to full-time experience 0.0325
βw2,part Dec/inc return to full-time experience -0.0060
βw3,part Return to education if part-time employed 0.157
βw4,part Return to part-time experience -0.078
βw5,part Dec/inc return to part-time experience -0.0023
Wage parameters (Full-time Employment, Female)
βw0,full 1.296
βw1,full Return to full-time experience 0.065
βw2,full Dec/inc return to full-time experience -0.0032
βw3,full Return to education if full-time employed 0.111
βw4,full Return to part-time experience 0.029
βw5,full Dec/inc return to part-time experience -0.004
in the child care moments of married women. However, the variation in hours of child care
does not vary by employment status of the married mother. Table A.3.2 shows the log daily
child care cost used by men and women. In general the model fits the daily cost of full-time
child care well but overstates the part-time daily cost of child care. The patterns in the
data suggest that single and married women with lower income, use less child care hours
than higher income women. Table A.3.3 fits this pattern for only single mothers but not
for married mothers.
1.5.2 Parameter Estimates
Table 1.1 reports the parameters estimated for wage equations. The difference between
the intercepts of log hourly wages of men and full-time working women shows the difference
in wages that cannot be explained by experience and education. The return to full-time
experience of men is estimated to be larger than the return to full-time experience of women.
The degree of concavity of return to full-time experience is estimated to be larger for men
than women. As a result as women gain more full-time experience, the difference in return
to full-time experience of men and women decreases. The return to education of full-time
employed men is twice as large as full-time employed women. The hourly college wage
premium is estimated to be 1.17 dollars for part-time working women and $1.11 for full-
time working women.
The difference in the intercept between part-time and full-time log hourly wages of
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women can be interpreted as part-time wage penalty. However, my estimates does not sug-
gest that a part-time pay penalty exists. The only difference between the wages of part-time
and full-time employed women can be captured b the differences in returns to experience
of these different states of employment. In fact, a part-time employed woman with no ex-
perience without a college degree earns about half a dollar more per hour compared to a
full-time employed woman of the same characteristics. The marginal return to full-time
experiences of a full-time employed woman is estimated to be higher than the marginal
return to part-time experience (also the marginal return to part-time experience decreases
at a much faster rate than the return to full-time experience). In addition, when part-
time employed, the return to part-time experience is higher than the return to full-time
experience. These differential returns to part-time and full-time experience conditional on
different employment status is substantial enough to create state dependence in part-time
and full-time sectors. To the extent that women with more part-time experience earn more
by being employed in a part-time job while those women with more full-time experience
benefit more from employment in full-time sector.
Table 1.2 reports preferences and household production parameters. The estimated
preference parameters are such that an additional unit of consumption gives a lower utility
than an additional unit of household goods. However, marginal utility of the child’s quality
is estimated to be about three times larger than the marginal utility of other household’s
goods. The estimated preferences show that when a child is present, more income is needed
to compensate for the time spent by the parents with the child. Marginal productivity of
housework hours of women is larger than for men which results in women’s specialization
in household production.
This estimate is a reflection of higher wages of men in the labour market compared to
women. Since men earn higher wages in the labour market they have higher cost of working
at home and therefore 1 hour of their work at home needs to be compensated with more
housework hours of women.
The utility of having a child is estimated to be positive and at 0.038 and the shock to
utility of having a child is 0.25. Probability of meeting a potential partner is 39 percent
and the variance in utility of marriage is estimated to be 3.7. This high variance in utility
of marriage, increases the risk of marriage. However, marriage is still an attractive option
because of public good and the positive utility obtained from having a child.
One hour of child care is estimated to cost 4.75 dollars which is larger than an hour
return to both full-time and part-time employment of a woman without a college degree and
no work experience. Therefore, women with low work experience and education might prefer
to stay at home and take care of their children. The degree of substitutability between child
care and housework hours is estimated at 0.381 resulting to an elasticity of substitution of
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Table 1.2: Parameters: Preferences and Household Production
Model Parameters Description Estimated Values
Preference parameters
αc Marginal utility from consumption 0.081
αq1 Marginal utility from household production 0.250
αq1 Marginal utility from household production 0.630
αch Marginal utility from having a child 0.038
Household Production
αm Marginal productivity of housework hours (married men) 0.304
αw Marginal productivity of housework hours (married women) 0.695
λ Marginal productivity of housework hours 0.808
γ Degree of substitutability between child care and housework hours 0.381
Shocks
mf Variance of full-time wages, male 0.152
wf Variance of full-time wages, women 0.466
wp Variance of part-time wages, women 0.562
mar Variance in utility of marriage 3.692
ch Variance in utility of having a child 0.251
CC Variance of child care cost 0.554
δ Discount factor 0.954
ω Probability of meeting a potential partner (men and women) 0.386
piCC Log Hourly child care cost 1.56
θ Bargaining weight in Nash product (not estimated) 0.5
1.6 indicating that housework hours and child care hours are close substitutes. Therefore,
at this cost of child care reducing labour hours and increasing house work hours can be
expected as long as the discounted expected future wages, due to lower of experience, do
not deter women from spending more time in home production. On the other hand, a
relative decline in the cost of child care, keeping the opportunity cost of home production
(wages) constant, should increase the use of child care and decrease housework hours (or
increase labour supply).
1.6 Policy Experiments 1
The objective of this paper is to understand whether child care subsidies can facilitate
the process of human capital accumulation and therefore affect life-time income of women.
In this section, I analyse the impact of such policies. In the first policy experiment The first
policy evaluates the impacts of a free child care subsidy which is given to women who are
either part-time or full-time employed (Policy 1). The second policy analyses the impacts
of a free child care subsidy which is only given to full-time employed individuals (Policy
2). My model allows me to evaluate how these policies affect employment decisions, wages,
divorce, marriage, and fertility rates simultaneously.
Figures A.4.5 and A.4.3 show the impact of these two policies on employment of single
and married mothers. Both policies move mothers from unemployment to employment.
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Figure 1.5: Employment Rate - Married
Mothers
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Figure 1.6: Employment Rate - Single
Mothers
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Figure 1.7: Daily Income from Employment (log)
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The child care policy which is given to all employed women irrespective of their hours of
work moves women to from unemployment to part-time employment (Policy 1). We can see
that the proportion of part-time employed women over the life-cycle increases. The obser-
vation of this pattern is due to the existence of a strong state dependence in sector-specific
employment. If an individual has more part-time experience than full-time experience, her
wages in part-time sector would be higher. Therefore, women who have chosen to work
part-time for some periods, become more likely to move to part-time employment in the
end of their life-cycle. However, the child care subsidy policy which is given to only full-time
employed women moves women from unemployment and part-time employment to full-time
employment. It can be seen that more women choose to continue to work full-time towards
the end of the life cycle. The state dependence in full-time employment, makes women to
seek employment in the sector with the highest accumulated sector-specific human capital.
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Figures A.4.4 and A.4.2 show that the policy has similar impacts on non-mothers. This
behaviour can be due to the fact that individuals in the model are forward looking. Single
women, anticipate that in case of having children, they might want to spend time with
the child at home. Since the return to part-time experience in part-time employment is
higher than the return to full-time experience, they decide to accumulate human capital
in the part-time sector. By accumulating experience in part-time sector, in case they have
children, they can obtain higher wages. Therefore, part-time employment in the part-time
sector even for non-mothers increases.
Figure 1.7 shows the impact of these two policies on life-time log daily income of full-
time and part-time employed women and full-time employed men. The policy does not
have any impact on daily income of men. Policy 1 leads to a decrease in the labour income
of part-time employed mothers which can be explained by the lower returns to part-time
experience. Policy 2 decreases daily labour income of both full-time and part-time employed
mothers. The reason for observing such an impact is that policy 2 moves women from all
different skill levels to full-time employment. Therefore, the average income of full-time
employed mothers decreases.
Figure 1.8-A.4.1 show the impact of these two policies on divorce rates, marriage rates,
and fertility rates. Both policies result in an increase in divorce rates and a decrease in
marriage rates. However, they do not affect the proportion of divorced men and women
having kids. The increase in the divorcees’ fraction can be explained by two channels in the
model. Firstly, since house work hours and child care hours are close substitutes, in case
of divorce, single individuals can increase labour market hours and substitute housework
Figure 1.8: Divorce and Marriage Fractions - by gender
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hours with child care at no cost. In the absence of policy, the cost of child care in case of
divorce would not allow men and women to do so. The policy therefore reduces the cost
of divorce and increases divorce rates. Secondly, the reform improves the outside option of
mothers to divorce, which is the value of being single. Prior to the reform, women who did
not have any work experience and had specialized in household production, upon divorce
would have a lower income outside marriage. The free child care policy allows these women
to substitute housework with child care and move to employment. Therefore, due to a
higher accumulated human capital, they will have a better income upon divorce. Since the
men’s income has remained unchanged, the husband cannot offer a higher transfer to the
wife to make the marriage a feasible option. Therefore, those marriages in which women
would have a lower consumption within marriage compared to their private consumption
in case of divorce dissolve.
1.7 Policy Experiments 2
A free child care subsidy program in practice must be financed. In this section, I show
the results of a free child care policy which is financed through a 20 percent income tax. The
choice of a 20 percent income tax is motivated by the fact that the estimated daily child care
costs comprise of about 20 percent of individuals’ daily income. In this section, I compare
the impact of 4 different policies on the estimated lifetime daily labour income of men and
women. The first two policies explore the implications of the child care subsidy programs
discussed in the previous section and the two other policies allow for general equilibrium
effects of these policies.
Table 1.3 reports a comparison of the effect of these policies on the estimated lifetime
labour income. In the upper panel of table 1.3 we can see that the free child care subsidy
programs conditional on employment and full-time employment, do not affect daily income
and working hours of men. When the policy is financed through an income tax, the hourly
wage and income decrease by the tax rate but men’s working hours remain almost un-
changed. The lower panel in table 1.3 shows the results of the same policy experiments for
women. We can see that a child care policy conditional on employment leads to a 3 percent
decrease in income. The decrease in income can be explained by the 20 percent decrease in
the daily working hours of women. When the child care subsidy is given to women who are
full-time employed, daily income compared to the benchmark model increases by 10 percent
which can be explained by an 18 percent increase in daily working hours.
When I incorporate the general equilibrium effects of the first and the second policy by
introducing a 20 percent income tax, the life-time income of women decreases by 37 percent
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Table 1.3: Lifetime Daily Labour Income (in dollars)*
All Sample
Experiments Daily Income Daily Working Hours
Male
Benchmark Model 97.80 9
Child Care|Employment 97.80 9
Child Care|Full-Employment 97.80 9
Child Care|Employment,taxes 78.22 8.998
Child Care|Full-Employment,taxes 78.22 8.998
Female
Benchmark Model 44.25 7.391
Child Care|Employment 42.69 5.822
Child Care|Full-Employment 49.21 8.758
Child Care|Employment,taxes 26.90 4.136
Child Care|Full-Employment,taxes 36.11 8.222
* Estimated daily lifetime labour income is the average of daily labour income taken across
individuals and over the lifetime. Non-workers have no daily lifetime income.
compared to the first policy and decreases by 26 percent compared to the second policy.
Introducing the income tax decreases income by more than the 20 percent tax rate. A tax
rise decreases the opportunity cost of home production and consequently decreases working
hours. Since the decrease in working hours when we introduce taxes to the first policy is
larger than the decrease in working hours when we introduce taxes to the second policy,
the decrease in lifetime income will also be larger in the former compared to the latter.
Table 1.4 reports the same results for employed women. We can see that the average
daily income of employed women in the benchmark model is higher than the income in
any of the policy experiments. This result indicates that in the benchmark model those
women who were receiving negative wage shocks and had lower skills would specialise in
home production and would not pay for the child care. However, when child care is free for
employed women,all women irrespective of the income shock specialize in the labour market.
The results from tables 1.3 and 1.4 imply that a free child care policy increases the overall
lifetime income of women by moving nonworking women to employment, nevertheless, the
average income of employed women decreases. The decrease in income of employed women
can be explained by the fact that under the free child care policy women from all different
skill and human capital levels can participate in the labour market while in the absence of
a free child care policy, those with lower skills cannot afford to do so.
Table 1.5 shows the the average life-time accumulated human capital of women. Com-
paring the impact of these policies with the benchmark model, it becomes clear that all the
free child care programs decrease the number of years that women spend out of the labour
market. But a free child care policy that is given to all mothers, leads to a 7 year increase
in the accumulated part-time human capital and a one year decrease in full-time employ-
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Table 1.4: Lifetime Daily Labour Income of Employed women (in dollars)*
All Sample
Experiments Daily Income Daily Working Hours
Benchmark Model 58.92 7.391
Child Care|Employment 42.72 5.822
Child Care|Full-Employment 50.15 8.758
Child Care|Employment,taxes 26.92 4.136
Child Care|Full-Employment,taxes 36.88 8.222
* Estimated daily lifetime labour income is the average of daily labour income taken across
individuals and over the lifetime. These averages are reported for working women and the
income of nonworking women are treated as missing.
ment. A child care subsidy which is given to only full-time employed women, increases the
accumulated full-time human capital from 10 to 19 years and decreases part-time human
capital from 6 to 2 years. The increase in part-time (full-time) human capital when the
policy is conditioned on employment (full-time employment) can be explained by the strong
state dependence in part-time and full-time employment.
Table 1.5: Lifetime Human Capital (in years)*
Average Lifetime Experience
Experiments Full-time Part-time Notworking
Benchmark Model 10.49 6.408 5.601
Child Care|Employment 9.062 13.42 0.0119
Child Care|Full-Employment 19.47 2.598 0.424
Child Care|Employment,taxes 4.652 17.83 0.0137
Child Care|Full-Employment,taxes 19.79 2.236 0.469
* Estimated daily lifetime labour income is the average of daily labour income taken across
individuals and over the lifetime. Non-workers have no daily lifetime income.
1.8 Conclusion
I develop and estimate a dynamic model of employment and fertility decisions in order
to understand the reasons for lower hourly wages of part-time employment relative to that
of full-time employment. In the model, labour supply, fertility, parental child investments,
and marital decisions are endogenously determined. Household decisions are modeled in a
Nash bargaining framework, where outside options are specified as spouses’ value of making
decisions as single agents. I use the dynamic model to evaluate the impact of child care
policies on prevalence and returns to employment.
I structurally estimate 31 parameters of the model using 1968-1996 waves of PSID. My
estimation results indicate that child care and house work hours are close substitutes. I show
that a policy that provides working mothers with free child care, when it is not conditional
on hours of work, moves women to part-time employment. Since the return to part-time
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employment is lower than full-time employment, such a policy might decrease the overall
earnings of women over the life-cycle. In contrast, child care subsidies that target intensive
margins of employment rather than only extensive margins, increase full-time employment
and consequently labour income of women.
I further show that child care policies have implications on marriage markets. Child
care subsidy programs lead to an increase in women’s accumulated human capital and sub-
sequently their income. As a result, the value of being single, as compared to the value of
being single in absence of the policy, increases and marriages which were not reflecting the
preferences of women dissolve. Therefore, free child care subsidies increase the fraction of
divorcees and decrease the fraction of married individuals.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of University Tuition
Fees on Children’s Educational
Aspirations
Dan Anderberg, Lena Hassani Nezhad, Melanie Lu¨hrmann
Abstract We evaluate the impact of 2012-13 increase in tuition fees on educational as-
pirations of 10-15 years old children in the UK. Our estimates suggest that the reform
decreased the overall university aspirations of children residing in England by 7.6 percent-
age points (or 9%) compared to children residing in Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland.
We further show that that the reform has widened the aspiration gaps in university aspi-
rations. The decline in university aspirations of children from the bottom 25% of income
quartile is estimated to be 8.6 percentage points larger than children coming from higher
income families.
2.1 Introduction
The UK government has tried to increase higher education participation of the pupils
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds over the past years, an agenda known as: “widening
participation”. Between 2004 and 2014, the gap in higher education of children from lower
socio-economic status decreased by 2 percentage points but remains at 17 percent high
in 2014. During the past few years, increase in aspirations towards education of younger
children, as a determinant factor of higher education attainment, has become the focus of
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policy makers (LLC, 2011). Despite the efforts put into increase in the participation of
pupils from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, the UK government increased the tuition fee
cap, from £3,465 to £9,000 per year in the 2012-2013 academic year.
The purpose of our paper is to study whether the increase in tuition fees has affected
education aspirations of teenagers. The increase in university tuition fees can affect the
returns to obtaining a university degree. On one hand, an increase in the tuition fees in-
creases the direct costs of obtaining a university degree. On the other hand, such an increase
might result in a lower supply of university graduates and can increase wages of the college
graduates. The net effect of such a change is therefore ambiguous. The first hypothesis in
our paper is whether the change in the monetary costs of education and the ambiguity in
returns to obtaining a university degree changes the aspirations of pupils towards higher
education. The change in tuition fees might not affect all pupils in the same way. Pupils
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to be financially constrained and
more likely to obtain higher education because of its monetary returns. Therefore, children
from lower income households are more likely to get affected by the ambiguity in the returns
to higher education. Our second hypothesis is therefore to examine whether the increase
in tuition fees have widened the gap between education aspirations of children from higher
and lower socioeconomic backgrounds.
The 2012-13 reform affected all students in the UK who intended to study outside their
home country as they could be charged up to £9,000. Our identification strategy comes
from the fact that students residing in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have the
option of staying in their home country and pay lower tuition fees while English students
have to pay the maximum tuition fees irrespective of the country of study. Therefore, we
define England as the treated country, and Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales as con-
trol countries. We define the treatment period when the reform was first announced rather
than the day when the reform was implemented. We use data from six waves of Under-
standing Society, the UK Household Longitudinal Study, in which 10-15 years old household
members are asked to complete a self-completion youth questionnaire. We construct three
variables which quantify university aspirations, A-levels aspirations, and GCSEs aspirations.
The results from our difference-in-difference estimations contribute to the literature in
higher education aspirations in three ways. First, we show that the tuition fees reform can
change aspirations of teenagers as young as 10-15 years old. Secondly, we quantify the im-
pact of the reform on children’s aspirations. We show that the reform is associated with a
9 percent decrease in university aspirations and 11 percent decrease in A-levels aspirations.
The final contribution of our paper is to empirically document that the increase in tuition
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fees widens the gap in university aspirations of teenagers. Our results indicate that the gap
in university aspirations and A-levels aspirations widened by 8.6 and 9.5 percentage points
respectively.
Our results point out that the availability of loans which directly target students from
low-income families have not been effective enough to lessen the impact of the increase in
tuition fess on aspirations of pupils. These estimates however do not show whether the
reform has resulted in a permanent change in aspirations and if the change in aspirations
will translate into a change in university attendance. It is possible that students learn about
the existence of loans at later ages and decide to attend university. We show that a change
in tuition fees might affect pupils as young as 10 years old and the UK government should
focus on informing the pupils about the availability of loans and benefits of higher education
at an earlier age.
2.2 Related Literature
Substantial research has been carried out to understand the factors that affect pupil’s
educational attainments. The lower level of educational attainment of students from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds can be attributed to the lower ability and lower human capi-
tal accumulation of these students because of lack of availability of resources during their
development (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Cunha et al., 2006). However, even more able
students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds might not choose to obtain higher edu-
cation levels because of financial constraints (Connor, 2001) or lower parental knowledge
or parental expectations towards higher education (Delavande and Zafar, 2013). Indeed
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) find that the role of ability in explaining education
outcomes has declined in the UK and this reduction can be partly explained by low ability
children with high economic status obtaining higher educational attainment.
The role of teenage aspirations in future career and educational attainments are im-
portant predictors of adult outcomes (Schoon and Parsons, 2002; Schoon and Polek, 2011).
Gregg and Washbrook (2011) find that socio-economic status of children are important
predictors of attainment gaps as early as key stage 2 results. Because of the important
role of aspirations in career and educational attainments, several studies have studied the
determinants of teenage aspirations . Family’s Socio-economic status, age, gender, ethnicity
as well as business cycles are among the factors affecting teenager’s aspirations. Aspira-
tions of children from low-income families have been shown to be lower than those from
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high-income families (Archer et al., 2014; Archer and Yamashita, 2003; Baker et al., 2014;
Chowdry et al., 2011), and the families’ socio-economic status can ,to some extent, explain
the lower higher education participation of pupils from lower socio-economic families (Croll
and Attwood, 2013).
Hartas (2016) using understanding society data shows that age and gender are signifi-
cant predictors of 10-15 year old aspirations. Boys have lower aspirations towards education
than girls (Berrington et al., 2016; Hartas, 2016; Rampino and Taylor, 2013). On the other
hand, Attwood and Croll (2011) find that both male and female students a re likely to have
negative views towards education. Similarly, Strand and Winston (2008) find no signifi-
cant differences in aspirations by gender. However, the last two studies, finding no gender
differential impacts, focus on schools in disadvantaged areas so their sample is not compa-
rable with the first group of studies. In terms of ethnicity, it has been shown that white
British pupils have the lowest aspirations towards higher education among other ethnicities
(Berrington et al., 2016; Strand and Winston, 2008). Taylor and Rampino (2014) study
the sensitivity of children’s educational aspirations to macroeconomic fluctuations showing
that high unemployment rates are positively related to aspirations.
Because of importance of aspirations towards education, in higher education participa-
tion, some policies in the UK specifically focused on raising aspirations of teenagers. In
2004, the government launched the Aimhigher campaign 1. to raise aspirations of 14-16
years old. There is some evidence that Aimhigher intervention in the UK, has been suc-
cessful in increasing higher education attendance of young pupils (Chilosi et al., 2010) and
especially those coming from disadvantaged groups (Emmerson, 2006).
In addition to the role of teenagers’ aspirations in higher education attainment, a number
of studies have shown a positive relationship between parental aspirations in higher edu-
cation and educational attainment of children (Chiapa et al., 2012; Gregg and Washbrook,
2011; Kirk et al., 2011; Spera et al., 2009). Delavande and Zafar (2013) use UK Under-
standing Society data and show that parents from higher socio-economic backgrounds have
higher expectations for their children compared to their counterpart. Also such policies such
as anti-poverty programs (PROGRESA in Mexico) seem to increase aspirations of parents
towards education of their children Chiapa et al. (2012).
1 Aimhigher includes localised interventions targeting pupil’s, ages 14-16, aspirations (14-16 years old). It
was an integration of Aimhigher: Excellence Challenge (established in 2001), and Aimhigher: Partnerships
for Progression (established in 2003) and provided summer schools and master classes to encourage more
students to apply to university. However, aimhigher was discontinued in 2011 (Doyle and Griffin, 2012).
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2.3 Institutional Setting
Education system in England, Northern Ireland, and Wales comprises of five key stages:
early years, primary, secondary, further education, and higher education. At the end of sec-
ondary school (age 16), all pupils take a series of exams called the General Certificate of
Secondary Education (GCSEs). Continuing further studies after age 16 is optional. Pupils
who continue to study further can choose between entering Advanced level program (A-
levels), vocational training, apprenticeship programs etc. However, only students who enter
A-levels and take the A-levels exam can enter universities. Scottish education system is
slightly different where students study 7 years of primary school and 6 years of secondary
school. The last two years of secondary school are not mandatory. At the end of the 4th
year of secondary school, the students sit Standard Grade (National 4/5) exams. Those who
decide to continue study take Advanced Higher exams as a qualification to enter university.
GCSEs grades and the results of A-levels exams are milestones for UK students to enter
universities. GCSEs grades determine whether the student can enter A-levels and good
colleges select students based on their GCSEs grades. Admission to universities in the UK
in based on the results of A-levels exams and some universities also use GCSEs grades in
addition to A-levels grades. Therefore, attitudes towards GCSEs grades and A-levels can
affect the likelihood of entering A-levels, which consequently affects probability of entering
university. The main focus of our paper is to understand how 2012-13 tuition fee reform
affects aspirations towards university. Since A-levels and GCSEs grades are necessary qual-
ifications to enter university, we also examine whether the reform has had an impact on
aspirations towards GCSEs grades and obtaining A-levels qualification.
2.3.1 University Tuition Fees before 2012-13 reform
Between 1962-1996, higher education in the UK was free and the state paid students’
tuition fees. In 1998 universal university tuition fees were first introduced in England,
Northen Ireland, and wales. The tuition fees was an upfront £1000 payment per year and
maintenance grants were also replaced with repayable student loans and only the poorest
students could get a maintenance grant. After Scotland’s autonomy in 1999, the Scottish
Parliament replaced tuition fees with a £2000 fee. The Student Awards Agency for Scot-
land (SAAS) pays this in full for Scottish students and they start paying the fee back after
graduation.
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In 2004, the fees in England, Northern Ireland, and Wales were increased to £3000
per year and income-contingent loans became available. The reform took place in 2006-
07 academic year and families earning less than £20,000 per year became eligible for a
non-repayable grant of £2,900 per year. The grant would decrease based on household’s
income and families with income more than 50,000 were not eligible for the grant. Income
contingent loans were also introduced, where students could take out a tuition loan up to a
maximum of what they were being charged. Repayment of these loans would take place at
a 9% fixed interest rate, once the student graduates and earns above 15,000.
2.3.2 2012-13 reform
The 2012-2013 reform was first announced on Tuesday 14th of December 2010. The
reform raised the tuition fee cap universities across the UK could charge, from £3,465 to
£9,000 per year. The students could take loans up to £9,000. The threshold for repaying
back the loans also increased from £15,795 to £21,000. The government also provided full
non-repayable maintenance grants for students from families with incomes under £25,000.
Universities charging more than £6,000 fees had to offer extra financial aid in the form
of bursaries or scholarships to eligible students from disadvantaged backgrounds and must
have an access agreement approved by the independent Director of Fair Access to attract
students from lower socio-economic backgrounds.
The reform did not affect the Scottish students who wanted to continue studying in
Scotland. Young Home Scottish students were eligible for a tuition fee waiver from SAAS
(Student Awards Agency for Scotland) if they decided to continue higher education in Scot-
land. Scottish students wishing to study in England, Northern Ireland or Wales; could be
charged up to £9000 but could apply to SAAS for a loan helping them in paying for the
additional cost. Students from Northern Ireland, had to pay only up to £3,465 per year
and could get a Tuition Fee Loan from Student Finance NI to cover this. Students from
Northern Ireland who wished to study anywhere else in the UK could be charged the full
tuition fees but loans of the full amount were available to them. The reform increased the
tuition fees in Wales to up to £9,000 similar to England. However, Welsh students could
apply for a Fee Grant of up to £5,000 which is neither income-based nor repayable. If the
tuition fee is larger than the Fee Grant, they can take up loans to cover the additional
tuition fees costs which is repayable. This system also applies to Welsh students who study
elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Table 2.1 summarises the changes in tuition costs and
funding available to students by country of residence.
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The 2012-13 reform affected all students in the UK who intended to study outside their
home country as they could be charged up to £9,000. Our identification strategy comes
from the fact that students born in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have the option of
staying in their home country and pay lower tuition fees while English students have to pay
the maximum tuition fees irrespective of where they study. Therefore, we define England
as the treated country, and Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales as control countries. We
define the treatment period when the reform was first announced rather than the day when
the reform was implemented. Figure 2.1 shows that the announcement date coincides with
the peak general interest in tuition fees, as evidenced by Google data. The figure shows
the number of hits, standardised to 100 at its peak. It also shows that there is no further
discontinuity in tuition information in the years following the announcement and we do not
see a spike in search intensity around the introduction date in September 2012. Motivated
by this figure, we define the treatment period from 14 December 2010 onward and take
this figure as an indicator that individuals in the UK as well as young people aged 10 and
older became aware of the increase in university tuition fees upon the reform announcement.
Table 2.2 shows the cross-border flows between different countries in the UK as a percent
of domicile students. The numbers on the diagonal show that There is a large tendency in the
UK to continue to study in the country of origin. About 97 percent of English students, 51
percent of Northern Irish students, 93 percent of Scottish students, and 80 percent of Welsh
students choose a university in their home country. The movements across countries in the
UK has some implications on our results. Some students in our control group countries,
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, who want to study abroad will also be treated. In
case of partial treatment of the control group, our reported estimates will be understated.
2.4 Data
We use data from six waves of Understanding Society, the UK Household Longitudinal
Study. Data collection for each wave takes place across 24 months when adult individuals
(age 16 or older) are interviewed. Household members 10-15 years old are asked to complete
a self-completion youth questionnaire. The unit of observation in our sample is 10-15 years
old boys and girls. The unbalanced sample consists of 10,704 individuals, of which 49.5 %
are male and 50.5 % are female.
Our main variables of interest are aspirations towards education, which are taken from
Youth surveys. We use three different questions to measure educational aspirations: “Would
you like to go to University?”, “What would you like to do at age 16?” and “How important
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is it to you to do well in GCSEs exams or Standard Grades (in Scotland)?”. We interpret
the first question as university aspirations as it directly measures whether the student in-
tends to obtain a university degree. The second question asks the students whether they
would like to continue to to study and receive A-levels or to stop studying. We treat this
question as aspirations towards obtaining A-levels. The third questions is regarding the
importance of GCSEs for the student and we use it as a measure for aspirations towards
GCSEs.
Using the above three questions, we construct 3 binary variables quantifying aspirations
as high or low. We construct a variable called high aspirations towards university which
equals one if the youth has answered “Yes” to the first question and zero if the answer
is “No”. Aspirations towards A-levels are constructed using “What to do at 16” question
and are classified as high aspirations towards A-levels if the youth has answered “Study
full-time” or “get a full-time job and study”, and low aspirations if the answer is “get a
full-time job”, “do something else”, “apprenticeship”, “other training”, or “don’t know”.
The binary variable for GCSEs aspirations is categorised as high aspirations if the youth’s
answer to importance of GCSEs question is “very important”, and as low aspiration if the
answer is “important”, “not very important”, or “not at all important” 2.
We match the youth data with individual and household databases, to obtain data on
mother’s education, household’s monthly net income, a measure of race, and urban regions.
We condition on mother’s education and define it as an indicator variable equal to 1 if she
has an A-levels degree or higher. Table 2.3 reports the distribution of the aspiration vari-
ables by country and gender. We can see that boys have lower aspirations towards education
compared to girls and this difference exists across all countries. This is in line with the pre-
vious literature in the UK that girls have higher aspirations towards education. Table 2.4
reports the distribution of aspiration variables by household’s income and mother’s educa-
tion. We can see variations in educational aspirations across all income quartiles. Children
from top 25 quartile of the income distribution have the highest aspirations towards edu-
cation across all income groups. Mothers education level is an important determinant of
educational aspirations irrespective of income quartiles.
Figure 2.2 shows a positive age trend in aspirations towards education. We can see a
gap in A-levels and university aspirations of children from lower socio-economic status and
this gap does not narrow as children get older. Table 2.5 reports the summary statistics by
treatment and control groups. For none of these groups we reject the null hypothesis that
2Individuals could skip the question on university aspirations, if the answer to what to do at age 16 is “get
a full-time job”. We treat those who have skipped university question but have answered “get a full-time
job” to A-levels question as low aspirations towards university.
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there is no difference between the variables in the control and treatment groups.
2.5 Results
The increase in university tuition fees changes the costs of obtaining a degree while
keeps the returns to education constant 3. If the monetary returns were the only reason
for attending universities, then the 2012-13 reform should have decreased the demand for
higher education and subsequently teenagers’ aspirations towards education. Therefore, the
first hypothesis in our paper is whether a change in monetary costs of education, changes
aspirations of pupils towards higher education. However, the change in tuition fees does not
affect all pupils in the same way. Pupils from lower socio-economic backgrounds are more
likely to be financially constrained and more likely to obtain higher education because of
its monetary returns. Therefore, children from lower income households are more likely to
get negatively affected by the increase in tuition fees. Our second hypothesis is to examine
whether the increase in tuition fees have widened the gap between educational aspirations of
children from higher and lower socio-economic backgrounds. We also evaluate the impact of
the reform on A-levels and GCSEs aspirations. Although A-levels and better GCSEs grades
are essential for entering the university, GCSEs can be also used to qualify for vocational
training and other qualifications while A-levels are a requirement for attending university.
Consequently, we expect the reform to affects A-levels aspirations but not GCSEs aspira-
tions.
To examine the first hypothesis, we evaluate the impact of the reform on university
aspirations of the entire sample using a difference-in-difference estimator. We estimate
linear probability models of the following form:
Aspirationsict = β0 + β1Treatic ∗Afterit + δiNi + β2TimeTrendt + ict
In Equation 2.5, Aspirationsict corresponds to aspirations of individual i in country c in
year t and is equal to 1 if the individual has high aspirations towards education. The policy
coefficient of interest is β1 which reports the differential impact of the reform on aspirations
of children residing in England after the reform. δi are the coefficients on individual fixed
3Here we assume that students do not take into account the general equilibrium impact of increase in
tuition fees which can reduce number of college graduates. The reduction in number of college graduates
might increase the wages of college graduates.
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effects. We estimate a fixed effect model to control for any unobserved factors that affect
aspirations towards education. β2 reports the coefficient on a time trend.
Table 2.6 reports the results of estimation of Equation 2.5. The coefficient on treat ∗
After in column 1 of table 2.6 shows that the reform decreases aspirations towards obtain-
ing a university degree by 7.6 percentage points. Considering that the mean aspirations
in England is 85%, the reform translates to 9 percent decrease in university aspirations.
A-levels aspirations also decreased by 11 percentage points (or 14 %). However, aspirations
towards GCSEs is unaffected by the reform. These results confirm our first hypothesis
that the increase in tuition fees decreased aspirations towards education of 10-15 years old
residing in England compared to pupils residing in Scotland, Wales , or Northern Ireland.
The Impact on A-levels aspiration is even higher than the impact on university aspirations.
One explanation could be that A-levels are considered to be the necessary qualifications to
attend university and since the decision to obtain A-levels is made closer in time, the pupils
might reflect more on A-levels aspirations rather than university aspirations.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 report the impact of the reform on men and women, separately. We
can see that the reform has affected teenage girls and teenage boys in the same way. The
magnitude of the impact is slightly smaller for boys than girls however the differences are
not statistically significantly different from zero.
To examine the second hypothesis, if the reform has had a differential impact on chil-
dren from lower socio-economic backgrounds, we allow the impact of the reform to vary for
pupils from lower and higher income households. We estimate an equation which allows for
the impact of the reform to vary by household income:
Aspirationsict = β0 + β1Treatic ∗Afterit ∗Bottom25ict + β2Treatic ∗Afterit
+ β3Bottom25ict + δiNi + β4TimeTrendt + ict
In Equation 2.5, β1 reports the differential impact of the reform on educational aspi-
rations of children residing in lower income as opposed to higher income households. β2
reports the differential impact of the reform on educational aspirations of higher income
households. β3 shows the difference between aspirations of children from lower income
households and higher income households.
52
Table 2.9 shows the estimated parameters of Equation 2.5. The coefficient on Treat ∗
After ∗ Bottom25 shows a negative significant differential impact of the reform on aspira-
tions to go to university of children from lower socio-economic backgrounds compared to
those from higher income backgrounds. More precisely, the reform increased the univer-
sity aspirations gap by 8 percentage points supporting our second hypothesis. Our results
confirm that children from lower socio economic backgrounds are more likely to be de-
terred from attending university by higher education costs rather than children from higher
income families. This might be because children from lower income households value the
monetary returns from higher education more than children from higher income households.
The results in columns 2 of Table 2.9 show that the reform also had a significant differ-
ential impact on A-levels aspirations of pupils from lower socio-economic backgrounds. The
decrease in aspirations of low-income pupils is estimated to be 9 percentage points lower
than their counterparts. We find no differential impact of the reform on GCSEs grades
which can be explained by the the fact that GCSEs grades are important qualifications for
getting vocational training and entering the job market at age 16.
We also examine the robustness of our results using the date of the implementation of
the reform as a placebo test. Table 2.10 reports the estimates for this placebo test. We can
see that the university aspirations increased by 4 percentage points after the introduction of
the reform. This increase in the aspirations might be related to the fact that later on pupils
learn about the possibility of loans and therefore there is slight decrease in their aspirations
after the introduction date. We also do not observe any change in the A-levels aspirations.
2.6 Conclusion
Increase in higher education attendance of students from lower socio-economic back-
grounds has been one of the main focuses of the UK policy makers. In addition, often lower
aspirations of children from lower socio-economic backgrounds have been argued to be an
important factor in the decision of obtaining higher education. Despite acknowledging the
importance of aspirations in the process of higher education attendance decision making,
the impact of 2012-13 increase in tuition fees reform on educational aspirations of children
has not been studied.
Our identification strategy in this paper comes from the fact that, the 2012-13 reform
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did not affect children residing in different countries in the UK in the same way. We study
the impact of the reform using a difference-in-difference estimator. Our estimation results
confirm our hypotheses that increase in tuition fees decreases university aspirations and this
impact is of a larger magnitude for pupils We empirically show that aspirations of children as
young as 10-15 years old has been affected by the reform. University aspirations decreased
by 7.6 percentage points and A-levels aspirations decreased by some 11 percentage points.
The important result of our paper is that the 2012-13 tuition fees reform , increased
the aspirations gap between pupils from higher and lower socio-economic backgrounds. We
empirically show that the impact of the reform on university aspirations of children from
lower socio-economic backgrounds is 8.6 percentage points larger than its impact on chil-
dren from higher income backgrounds. The negative differential impact of the reform on
A-levels aspirations of children from lower socio-economic backgrounds is also estimated to
be higher and in the magnitude of 9.5 percentage points.
It is unclear whether availability of loans and grants has had any impacts on higher
educational aspirations. The message of our paper however is that even in presence of such
loans and grants, the increase in tuition fees have decreased educational aspirations and
widened the gap among children coming from lower and higher income families.
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Graphs and Figures
Table 2.1: 2012-13 Tuition Fee Reform in the UK
Before After
Study in Home Country Study Abroad
Country Tuition Fee Cap Student Finance Tuition Fee Cap Student Finance Tuition Fee Cap Student Finance
per annum per annum per annum
England £3,000 Means tested £9,000 Up to £9,000 loan £9,000 Up to £9,000 loan
£3,000 loan
Scotland £3,000 Tuition covered No Tuition Fees Tuition covered £9,000 Up to £9,000 loan
by SAAS by SAAS
Wales £3,000 Means Tested £9,000 £5,535 grant £9,000 £5,535 grant
£3,000 loan £3,465 loan £3,465 loan
Northern £3,000 Means Tested £4,000 Up to 4,000 loan £9,000 Up to £9,000 loan
Ireland £3,000 loan
Table 2.2: Cross border flows of university entrants by domicile and country of institution
in 2007-2008
Country of Higher Education Institution
Country of domicile England Northern Ireland Scotland Wales
England 97.10% 0.06% 0.98% 1.87%
Northern Ireland 11.85% 50.95% 36.72% 0.48%
Scotland 6.64% 0.07% 92.93% 0.36%
Wales 19.27% 0.03% 0.50% 80.20%
Numbers are reported as percent of domicile. Primary Source: HESA. Secondary source: Table 1 in
(UK, 2017).
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Figure 2.1: Interest in Tuition Fees in the UK Over Time
Data source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends). The figure shows the search for
term “Tuition Fees” in the UK. Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest
point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity
for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. Likewise a score of
0 means the term was less than 1% as popular as the peak.
Figure 2.2: Age trend in Aspirations Towards Education
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Aspiration Variables by Country
Aspiration Country Gender Mean SE No. P-value
Ha: Diff in mean 6= 0
University England Male 0.802 0.00452 7775 0.00
Female 0.905 0.00326 8055
Wales Male 0.766 0.0182 543 0.00
Female 0.912 0.0112 639
Scotland Male 0.800 0.0141 808 0.00
Female 0.923 0.00909 859
Northern Ireland Male 0.774 0.0158 700 0.00
Female 0.863 0.0134 656
A-levels England Male 0.704 0.00488 8735 0.00
Female 0.831 0.00403 8662
Wales Male 0.681 0.0187 623 0.00
Female 0.846 0.0140 667
Scotland Male 0.686 0.0156 891 0.00
Female 0.855 0.0117 899
Northern Ireland Male 0.701 0.0163 786 0.00
Female 0.809 0.0144 745
GCSEs England Male 0.763 0.00430 9776 0.00
Female 0.800 0.00407 9644
Wales Male 0.781 0.0157 693 0.009
Female 0.834 0.0135 759
Scotland Male 0.772 0.0131 1025 0.007
Female 0.819 0.0120 1033
Northern Ireland Male 0.734 0.0148 892 0.004
Female 0.793 0.0141 830
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics of Aspiration Variables by Income and Mother’s Education
Aspiration Income Education Mean SE No P-value
Ha: Diff in mean 6= 0
University Top 25% Below A-levels 0.849 0.0107 1127 0.00
A-levels & Higher 0.922 0.00437 3771
Middle Below A-levels 0.799 0.00615 4235 0.00
A-levels & Higher 0.880 0.00453 5140
Bottom 25% Below A-levels 0.797 0.00756 2834 0.00
A-levels & Higher 0.862 0.00812 1807
A-levels Top 25% Below A-levels 0.784 0.0116 1252 0.00
A-levels & Higher 0.865 0.00535 4081
Middle Below A-levels 0.697 0.00662 4812 0.00
A-levels & Higher 0.802 0.00534 5567
Bottom 25% Below A-levels 0.684 0.00835 3103 0.00
A-levels & Higher 0.781 0.00933 1966
GCSEs Top 25% Below A-levels 0.800 0.0107 1397 0.26
A-levels & Higher 0.813 0.00579 4540
Middle Below A-levels 0.769 0.00572 5431 0.00
A-levels & Higher 0.790 0.00516 6229
Bottom 25% Below A-levels 0.752 0.00733 3477 0.00
A-levels & Higher 0.797 0.00860 2184
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of Aspiration Variables by Income and Mother’s Education
Variables Mean SE No. P-value
Ha: Diff in mean 6= 0
Age Control 12.65 0.0231 5,348 0.00
Treated 12.51 0.0119 20,008
Real Gross Income Control 4125.69 35.86 5,015 0.007
Treated 4246.95 21.25 18,902
% of mothers A-levels Control 0.599 0.00692 5,015 0.00
and higher Treated 0.543 0.00362 18,902
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Table 2.6: The Impact of the Tuition Fee Reform on Educational Aspirations
University A-levels GCSEs
Treat*After -0.076*** -0.111*** 0.045
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log(age) 0.302* 0.438** 0.242
(0.16) (0.19) (0.16)
Log TimeTrend 0.041 -0.017 -0.026
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.090 -0.256 0.186
(0.34) (0.39) (0.33)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.024 0.014 0.006
No. of cases 6466 7153 8368
All regressions control for age, log time trend and individual fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Understanding Society]
Table 2.7: The Impact of the Tuition Fee Reform on Educational Aspirations - male
University A-levels GCSEs
Treat*After -0.086* -0.119*** 0.035
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Log(age) 0.311 0.444 0.203
(0.25) (0.29) (0.23)
Log-TimeTrend 0.070 -0.025 0.009
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
Constant -0.023 -0.330 0.219
(0.52) (0.59) (0.46)
R2 0.031 0.012 0.009
No. of cases 3195 3629 4230
All regressions control for age, log time trend and individual fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Understanding Society]
Table 2.8: The Impact of the Tuition Fee Reform on Educational Aspirations - female
University A-levels GCSEs
Treat*After -0.067* -0.100** 0.054
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Log(age) 0.283 0.437* 0.275
(0.22) (0.25) (0.23)
Log-TimeTrend 0.017 -0.011 -0.058
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Constant 0.218 -0.195 0.164
(0.44) (0.51) (0.47)
R2 0.018 0.017 0.004
No. of cases 3271 3524 4138
All regressions control for age, log time trend and individual fixed ef-
fects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respec-
tively.
Source: Understanding Society]
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Table 2.9: The Differential Impact of the Tuition Fee Reform on Educational Aspirations
of Bottom 25%
University A-levels GCSEs
After*Treat*Bottom25 -0.086** -0.095** -0.009
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Treat*After -0.055* -0.089*** 0.047
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Bottom25 0.071** 0.063 -0.012
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Log(age) 0.305* 0.436** 0.239
(0.16) (0.19) (0.16)
Log TimeTrend 0.040 -0.016 -0.025
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.066 -0.266 0.193
(0.33) (0.39) (0.33)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.026 0.015 0.007
No. of cases 6466 7153 8368
All regressions control for age, log time trend and individual fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Understanding Society]
Table 2.10: Placebo test of the impact of the Tuition Fee Reform on Educational Aspirations
University A-levels GCSEs
Treat*After 0.040* 0.002 0.014
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log(age) 0.468*** 0.697*** 0.138
(0.15) (0.17) (0.15)
Log-TimeTrend -0.070 -0.145*** 0.015
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Constant -0.235 -0.786** 0.405
(0.30) (0.35) (0.30)
R2 0.023 0.011 0.006
No. of cases 6466 7153 8368
The introduction date in the placebo test is defined as the date of in-
troducing the reform: 1 September 2012. All regressions control for age,
log time trend and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Understanding Society]
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Appendices
A.1 History of Child Care Policies in the US
This section gives a brief overview of the US child care policies after World War II.
Parents face different child care options: nurseries, kindergartens, care by relatives, and
care by non-relatives. Up to early twentieth century, most of the child care was provided
by relatives in the US. During the second World War, congress passed the Lanham Act, in
1941, to provide funds for child care of working mothers. The Act was motivated by the
increase in employment rate of mothers whose employment was encouraged by Rosie the
Riveter campaign. The Lehman Act was the only universal child care policy adopted in
the history of the US child care policy which did not target women based on their income.
However, its funding was withdrawn in 1946 after the end of the WWII (Herbst, 2017).
In 1965, motivated by War on Poverty program of President Johnson, a comprehensive
child care program, known as Head start, was adopted which targeted children from low
income families. Its pilot program started as a summer school to prepare children from
low-income families for elementary school. Thereafter, it was expanded to a full school year
in 1966 and started offering services to children aged 0-3 in 1977. In 1994, Early Head Start
program was adopted which provided services to pregnant women and infants and toddlers
(Learnings and Knowledge Center, 2017).
In 1977, the Comprehensive Child Development Act was passed by bipartisan vote in the
congress. The Act proposed an allocation of $2.1 billion for a national childcare program.
which would have offered low-income families free child care services while families from
higher income families would have faced progressive costs based on their income (Dinner,
2010). However, the bill, despite the support from both the House of Representatives and
the Senate, was vetoed by President Nixon. Several other child care policies were proposed
afterwards, including Act for Better Child Care Services (ABC), which were vetoed or did
not pass by the congress (Palley and Shdaimah, 2014, pg. 51-60).
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Between 1986 and 1996, there were 4 different programs in the US providing child care
assistance to low income families. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was
a program adopted in 1935 which provided financial assistance to low (no) income families
with children. Following the family support Act of 1988, families who were eligible for
AFDC became automatically eligible for child care assistance and those families who were
no longer eligible for AFDC and could not afford to pay for child care received Transitional
Child Care (TCC) assistance. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, approved of two
different types of child care: At Risk Child care (ARCC) and Child Care and Development
Block Grant (CCDBG). The former targeted families who were at risk of needing assistance
and the latter offered child care assistance to families whose income fell below 75 percent
of median income of the state (Michel, 2017).
In 1996, after ratification of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA),
AFDC was replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The above 4
different child care policies were also put into a single block grant: Child Care and Devel-
opment Fund (CCDF). According to PRWORA, if families do not have access to child care,
they should be exempt from work requirement criterion for welfare eligibility. However,
in practice, many families with children younger than 13 ,who are eligible for child care
services under federal law, fail to receive them under state law. The states can reduce the
child care service requirement age and lower the income eligibility ceiling to receive subsi-
dies (Herbst, 2008). According to Mezey et al. (2002) only 14 percent of federally eligible
children received child care in 2000. Hence, the US is falling behind other OECD countries
in assisting families to balance work and family by failing to provide them with adequate
child care. While many high and middle income families can afford to pay for child care,
the low income families who are not eligible for child care subsidies need to rely on relatives
for child care. The need for child care in the US is hence an ongoing debate.
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A.2 Supplementary Graphs and Tables
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Table A.2.2: Number of periods each observation is interviewed - Entire Sample
No. of Periods Men Women Total % of Total
3 361 313 674 7.500
4 367 380 747 8.400
5 260 282 542 6.100
6 230 226 456 5.100
7 210 219 429 4.800
8 198 192 390 4.400
9 197 187 384 4.300
10 197 208 405 4.500
11 182 189 371 4.200
12 168 187 355 4
13 157 172 329 3.700
14 130 147 277 3.100
15 147 157 304 3.400
16 144 145 289 3.200
17 129 160 289 3.200
18 137 150 287 3.200
19 106 137 243 2.700
20 123 113 236 2.600
21 117 122 239 2.700
22 116 126 242 2.700
23 89 120 209 2.300
24 108 134 242 2.700
25 109 116 225 2.500
26 113 107 220 2.500
27 76 114 190 2.100
28 79 80 159 1.800
29 63 135 198 2.200
Total 4,313 4,618 8,931
% of total 48% 52% 100%
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Table A.2.3: Number of periods each observation is interviewed - Matched with CDS
No. of Periods Men Women Total % of Total
3 69 57 126 6
4 79 84 163 7.800
5 52 74 126 6
6 55 57 112 5.300
7 46 47 93 4.400
8 51 65 116 5.500
9 46 46 92 4.400
10 55 63 118 5.600
11 48 55 103 4.900
12 51 61 112 5.300
13 45 58 103 4.900
14 47 45 92 4.400
15 50 52 102 4.900
16 47 55 102 4.900
17 37 49 86 4.100
18 41 46 87 4.100
19 25 30 55 2.600
20 28 33 61 2.900
21 27 23 50 2.400
22 22 29 51 2.400
23 20 14 34 1.600
24 21 17 38 1.800
25 12 15 27 1.300
26 11 5 16 0.800
27 9 4 13 0.600
28 8 4 12 0.600
29 6 6 12 0.600
Total 1,008 1,094 2,102
% of total 48% 52% 100%
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Table A.2.4: CDS and Non-CDS sample differences
Variable Sex Mean Std. Min Max No.
Non-CDS College Male 0.487 0.00207 0 1 58050
Divorced 0.251 0.00180 0 1 58050
Married 0.681 0.00193 0 1 58050
Single 0.0676 0.00104 0 1 58050
College Female 0.421 0.00197 0 1 62572
Divorced 0.267 0.00177 0 1 62572
Married 0.667 0.00188 0 1 62572
Single 0.0655 0.000989 0 1 62572
CDS College Male 0.604 0.00400 0 1 14935
Divorced 0.122 0.00268 0 1 14935
Married 0.803 0.00325 0 1 14935
Single 0.0745 0.00215 0 1 14935
College Female 0.622 0.00391 0 1 15366
Divorced 0.132 0.00273 0 1 15366
Married 0.777 0.00336 0 1 15366
Single 0.0910 0.00232 0 1 15366
Table A.2.5: Hours and Cost of Child Care - by marital and employment status - mothers
Weekly Hours Weekly Cost
Employment Status Proportion Mean SE No. Mean SE No.
Married
Full-time 32.27% 17.21 0.420 2155 30.61 0.944 2010
Part-time 33.83% 8.995 0.309 2259 19.71 0.827 2157
Not Working 33.90% 2.349 0.168 2264 4.341 0.351 2217
Single
Full-time 47.00% 13.86 0.830 509 17.71 1.364 456
Part-time 27.79% 9.832 1.035 301 12.80 1.669 283
Not Working 25.21% 4.728 0.788 273 3.072 0.698 261
Table A.2.6: Hours and Cost of Child Care - by marital and employment status - fathers
Weekly Hours Weekly Cost
Employment Status Proportion Mean SE No. Mean SE No.
Married
Full-time 89.72 9.322 0.202 5855 18.15 0.481 5604
Part-time 8.351 9.983 0.758 545 16.22 1.343 521
Not Working 1.931 8.540 1.786 126 11.93 3.683 119
Single
Full-time 69.75 10.05 1.116 302 13.97 1.692 280
Part-time 18.01 4.028 1.138 78 5.742 2.007 75
Not Working 12.24 6.840 1.966 53 10.16 4.803 48
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Table A.2.7: Two step labour market transition patterns, women vs men (10<part-time<35)
Year t+1
Year t Not Working Part-time Full-time Row Totals
Women
Not Working % of total 25.72 5.072 1.420 32.22
% of row 79.85 15.74 4.406
No. 14,261 2,812 787 17,860
Part-time % of total 4.784 14.96 7.295 27.04
% of row 17.69 55.34 26.97
No. 2,652 8,296 4,044 14,992
Full-time % of total 1.360 6.708 32.67 40.74
% of row 3.338 16.47 80.20
No. 754 3,719 18,114 22,587
Column Totals 31.87 26.74 41.39 100.00
Men
Not Working % of total 1.088 0.541 0.480 2.109
% of row 51.60 25.66 22.74
No. 531 264 234 1,029
Part-time % of total 0.660 3.505 5.630 9.794
% of row 6.738 35.78 57.48
No. 322 1,710 2,747 4,779
Full-time % of total 0.553 5.322 82.22 88.10
% of row 0.628 6.042 93.33
No. 270 2,597 40,118 42,985
Column Totals 2.30 9.37 88.33 100.00
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Table A.2.8: Two step labour market transition patterns, women vs men (10<part-time<30)
Year t+1
Year t Not Working Part-time Full-time Row Totals
Women
Not Working % of total 25.72 4.464 2.027 32.22
% of row 79.85 13.86 6.293 100
No. 14,261 2,475 1,124 17,860
Part-time % of total 4.192 8.970 6.236 19.40
% of row 21.61 46.24 32.15 100
No. 2,324 4,973 3,457 10,754
Full-time % of total 1.952 5.662 40.77 48.39
% of row 4.034 11.70 84.26 100
No. 1,082 3,139 22,604 26,825
Column Totals 31.87 19.1 49.04 100.00
Men
Not Working % of total 1.088 0.434 0.586 2.109
% of row 51.60 20.60 27.79
No. 531 212 286 1,029
Part-time % of total 0.525 1.601 3.730 5.855
% of row 8.960 27.34 63.70
No. 256 781 1,820 2,857
Full-time % of total 0.689 3.589 87.76 92.04
% of row 0.748 3.899 95.35
No. 336 1,751 42,820 44,907
Column Totals 2.30 5.62 92.07 100.00
72
Table A.2.9: Two step labour market transition patterns, women vs men (10<part-time<37)
Year t+1
Year t Not Working Part-time Full-time Row Totals
Women
Not Working % of total 25.72 5.251 1.241 32.22
% of row 79.85 16.30 3.852
No. 14,261 2,911 688 17,860
Part-time % of total 4.971 17.68 7.711 30.36
% of row 16.38 58.22 25.40
No. 2,756 9,799 4,275 16,830
Full-time % of total 1.172 7.172 29.08
% of row 3.133 19.16 77.70 37.43
No. 650 3,976 16,123 20,749
Column Totals 31.86 30.10 38.03 100.00
Men
Not Working % of total 1.088 0.570 0.451 2.109
% of row 51.60 27.02 21.38
No. 531 278 220 1,029
Part-time % of total 0.709 4.974 6.398 12.08
% of row 5.869 41.17 52.96
No. 346 2,427 3,122 5,895
Full-time % of total 0.504 6.105 79.20 85.81
% of row 0.588 7.115 92.30
No. 246 2,979 38,644 41,869
Column Totals 2.30 11.65 86.05 100.00
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Table A.2.10: Three step labour market transition patterns, women (10<part-time<35)
Year t+2
Year t & t+1 Not Working Part-time Full-time Row Totals
Not working,Not working % of total 22.06 3.396 0.690 26.15
% of row 84.37 12.99 2.640
No. 11088 1707 347 13142
Not working,Part-time % of total 1.484 2.537 1.176 5.197
% of row 28.56 48.81 22.63
No. 746 1275 591 2612
Not working,Full-time % of total 0.209 0.388 0.840 1.437
% of row 14.54 27.01 58.45
No. 105 195 422 722
Part-time,Not working % of total 3.108 1.301 0.414 4.823
% of row 64.44 26.98 8.581
No. 1562 654 208 2424
Part-time,Part-time % of total 2.000 9.789 3.116 14.90
% of row 13.42 65.68 20.91
No. 1005 4920 1566 7491
Part-time,Full-time % of total 0.374 1.966 4.970 7.310
% of row 5.117 26.89 67.99
No. 188 988 2498 3674
Full-time,Not working % of total 0.754 0.334 0.219 1.307
% of row 57.69 25.57 16.74
No. 379 168 110 657
Full-time,Part-time % of total 1.168 2.730 2.698 6.596
% of row 17.71 41.39 40.90
No. 587 1372 1356 3315
Full-time,Full-time % of total 0.734 4.250 27.29 32.28
% of row 2.275 13.17 84.56
No. 369 2136 13717 16222
Column Totals 31.89 26.69 41.42 100.00
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Table A.2.11: Three step labour market transition patterns, men
Year t+2
Year t & t+1 Not Working Part-time Full-time Row Totals
Not Working,Not Working % of total 0.708 0.152 0.0863 0.947
% of row 74.82 16.07 9.113 100
No. 312 67 38 417
Not Working,Part-time % of total 0.0795 0.204 0.234 0.518
% of row 15.35 39.47 45.18 100
No. 35 90 103 228
Not Working,Full-time % of total 0.0227 0.0817 0.370 0.475
% of row 4.785 17.22 77.99 100
No. 10 36 163 209
Part-time,Not Working % of total 0.204 0.236 0.127 0.568
% of row 36 41.60 22.40 100
No. 90 104 56 250
Part-time,Part-time % of total 0.238 1.548 1.560 3.347
% of row 7.123 46.27 46.61 100
No. 105 682 687 1474
Part-time,Full-time % of total 0.104 1.010 4.493 5.608
% of row 1.862 18.02 80.12 100
No. 46 445 1979 2470
Full-time,Not Working % of total 0.143 0.114 0.204 0.461
% of row 31.03 24.63 44.33 100
No. 63 50 90 203
Full-time,Part-time % of total 0.325 1.551 3.245 5.120
% of row 6.341 30.29 63.37 100
No. 143 683 1429 2255
Full-time,Full-time % of total 0.434 4.101 78.42 82.96
% of row 0.523 4.943 94.53 100
No. 191 1806 34540 36537
Column Totals 2.26 9 88.74 100.00
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Table A.2.12: Differential Returns to Hourly Experience, Part-time Specification
Log Hourly Wages
10<part<30 10<part<35 10<part<37
b/t b/t b/t
TotalExper(Hour) 0.000088*** 0.000089*** 0.000089***
40.24 39.19 38.36
PartExper(Hour) -0.000075*** -0.000042*** -0.000033***
-6.42 -5.96 -5.07
TotalExper2 -0.000000*** -0.000000*** -0.000000***
-23.26 -22.95 -22.63
PartExper2 0.000000*** 0.000000*** 0.000000***
5.61 6.56 5.36
College 0.399*** 0.405*** 0.407***
16.43 16.62 16.68
Constant 0.563*** 0.552*** 0.544***
23.28 23.19 22.89
R2 0.425 0.423 0.422
No. of cases 30585 30585 30585
Source: PSID - t-statistics are reported
Table A.2.13: The differnetial impact of part-time experience on wages (Women)
Log Hourly Wages
10<part<30 10<part<35 10<part<37
b/t b/t b/t
TotalExper(Hour) 0.000104*** 0.000104*** 0.000103***
27.93 25.89 24.52
PartExper(Hour) -0.000040** -0.000019* -0.000012
-2.97 -2.18 -1.49
TotalExper2 -0.000000*** -0.000000*** -0.000000***
-15.07 -14.41 -14.01
PartExper2 0.000000*** 0.000000*** 0.000000**
3.95 4.09 3.03
College 0.341*** 0.342*** 0.344***
12.40 12.40 12.45
Constant 0.369*** 0.361*** 0.355***
14.62 14.85 14.70
R2 0.387 0.387 0.386
No. of cases 18965 18965 18965
Source: PSID - t-statistics are reported
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Table A.2.14: The differnetial impact of part-time experience on wages (Men)
Log Hourly Wages
10<part<30 10<part<35 10<part<37
b/t b/t b/t
TotalExper(Hour) 0.000054* 0.000054* 0.000054*
26.31 26.02 25.59
PartExper(Hour) 0.000036 0.000000 -0.000013
1.04 0.78 -0.91
TotalExper2 -0.000000* -0.000000* -0.000000*
-14.85 -14.81 -14.67
PartExper2 -0.000000* -0.000020 0.000000
-2.03 -1.16 0.89
College 0.390* 0.394* 0.397*
9.42 9.22 9.27
Constant 1.107* 1.117* 1.112*
28.23 27.26 27.15
R2 0.332 0.327 0.326
No. of cases 11620 11620 11620
Source: PSID - t-statistics are reported
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Figure A.2.1: Year of Birth of Children in CDS
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Figure A.2.2: Part-time employment, men vs women
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Source: PSID (The US), age 18−50Figure A.2.3: Part-time employment, men vs women
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Figure A.2.4: Employment around the time of first birth - Women
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Figure A.2.5: Part-time employment around the time of first birth -Women
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Figure A.2.6: Part-time employment around the time of first birth - Women
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Figure A.2.7: Employment around the time of first birth - Men
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Figure A.2.8: Part-time employment around the time of first birth - Men
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Figure A.2.9: Hourly Cost of Child Care of Mothers - by employmnet status and child’s age
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Figure A.2.10: Hourly Cost of Child Care of Mothers - by marital status and child’s age
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Figure A.2.11: Log hourly wage differentials by working hours
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Figure A.2.12: Log hourly wage differentials by working hours
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Figure A.2.13: Average Child’s Age, by Arrangements
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Figure A.2.14: Average Weekly Cost, by Arrangements
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Figure A.2.15: Average Weekly Hours, by Arrangements
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Figure A.2.16: Average Child’s Age, by Arrangements and Year
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Figure A.2.17: Average Weekly Cost, by Arrangement and Year
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Figure A.2.18: Average Weekly Hours, by Arrangement and Year
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Figure A.3.1: Employment Rate - Single
Women - No child
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Figure A.3.2: Employment Rate - Single
Mothers
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Figure A.3.3: Employment Rate - Mar-
ried Women - No child
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Figure A.3.4: Employment Rate - Mar-
ried Mothers
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Figure A.3.5: Employment Rate - Single
Women - No College
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Figure A.3.6: Employment Rate - Single
Women - College
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Figure A.3.7: Employment Rate - Mar-
ried Women - No College
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Figure A.3.8: Employment Rate - Mar-
ried Women - College
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Figure A.3.9: Log hourly wage - by edu-
cation and employment status - women
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Figure A.3.10: Log hourly wage by em-
ployment status and education - women
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Figure A.3.11: Log hourly wage by em-
ployment status and education - women
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Figure A.3.12: Female employment rates
- by experience
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Figure A.3.13: Log hourly wage by education - Men
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Figure A.3.14: Log hourly wage by marital status - Men
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Figure A.3.15: Log hourly wage by marital status - women
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Figure A.3.16: Log Daily Income from Employment
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Figure A.3.17: Fraction Married - by gender
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Figure A.3.18: Fraction Divorced - by gender
0%
20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
Fr
ac
tio
n 
di
vo
rc
ed
18−21 22−25 26−29 30−33 34−37 38−41 42−45 46−49
Age
Male
0%
20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
Fr
ac
tio
n 
di
vo
rc
ed
18−21 22−25 26−29 30−33 34−37 38−41 42−45 46−49
Age
Female
Data Model
Figure A.3.19: Fraction Having Kids - by marital status
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Table A.3.1: Child Care Hours - by gender and marital status
Gender Marital Status Labour Hours CChours Simulations Data
Women Single Full-time No CCare 0.815 0.247
Part-time 0.166 0.351
Full-time 0.020 0.403
Part-time No CCare 0.810 0.364
Part-time 0.172 0.455
Full-time 0.019 0.182
Unemployed No CCare 0.934 0.674
Part-time 0.058 0.281
Full-time 0.007 0.045
Men Single Full-time No CCare 0.816 0.439
Part-time 0.165 0.394
Full-time 0.019 0.168
Women Married Full-time No CCare 0.322 0.213
Part-time 0.439 0.370
Full-time 0.240 0.418
Part-time No CCare 0.319 0.401
Part-time 0.439 0.489
Full-time 0.243 0.110
Unemployed No CCare 0.316 0.753
Part-time 0.439 0.221
Full-time 0.245 0.025
Table A.3.2: Log Daily Child Care Cost - by gender and marital status
Gender Marital Status Labour Hours CChours Simulations Data
Women Single Full-time Part-time 2.809 1.903
Full-time 2.732 2.369
Part-time Part-time 2.806 1.648
Full-time 2.729 2.424
Unemployed Part-time 2.526 1.468
Full-time 2.539 2.130
Men Single Full-time Part-time 2.809 1.824
Full-time 2.732 2.629
Women Married Full-time Part-time 3.422 2.075
Full-time 3.305 2.564
Part-time Part-time 3.423 2.061
Full-time 3.304 2.597
Unemployed Part-time 3.420 1.448
Full-time 3.303 2.346
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Table A.3.3: Log Daily Income - by hours of child care, gender, and marital status
Gender Marital Status CChours Simulations Data
Male Single No CCare 4.541 3.245
Part-time 4.540 3.642
Full-time 4.538 3.290
Female No CCare 3.168 1.468
Part-time 3.570 2.420
Full-time 3.595 3.510
Male Married No CCare 4.583 4.319
Part-time 4.581 4.436
Full-time 4.581 4.305
Female No CCare 2.555 1.287
Part-time 2.538 2.829
Full-time 2.518 3.779
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A.4 Policy Experiments
Figure A.4.1: Fraction Having Kids - by marital status
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Figure A.4.2: Employment Rate -
Single Women - No child
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Figure A.4.3: Employment Rate -
Single Mothers
0%
20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
Fu
ll 
− 
tim
e
18−21 22−25 26−29 30−33 34−37 38−41 42−45 46−49
Age
0%
20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
Pa
rt 
− 
tim
e
18−21 22−25 26−29 30−33 34−37 38−41 42−45 46−49
Age
0%
20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
Un
em
pl
oy
ed
18−21 22−25 26−29 30−33 34−37 38−41 42−45 46−49
Age
Policy1 Policy2
Benchmark
Figure A.4.4: Employment Rate -
Married Women - No child
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Figure A.4.5: Employment Rate -
Married Mothers
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